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ABSTRACT
In September, 1914'* William F. Willoughby arrived in 
Peking to serve as legal adviser to Yuan Shih-k'ai, 
President of the Republic of China. He brought to his 
work in China extensive experience in government re­
organization. While serving as treasurer of the Council 
of Puerto Rico, a member of the Taft Commission on 
Economy and Efficiency in Government, and as assistant 
director of the Census Bureau, he had won significant 
acclaim for his efforts to introduce the techniques of 
scientific management to public administration. This 
thesis is the result of an investigation and evaluation 
of Willoughby's eighteen-month tenure as adviser.
Like American Minister Paul Reinsch and President 
Woodrow WiIson, Willoughby believed that no progress 
toward true republican government could be made in China 
without the existence of a stable government. Conse­
quently, he proposed significant changes in China's 
taxation and civil service systems and urged Yuan Shih- 
k'ai to establish close political and financial ties 
with the United States. The existence of a strong- 
government and close ties with the United States not only 
enhanced the prospects for eventual republican government 
but allowed China to become a "fair field" for American 
economic, political, and social influence.
A study of Willoughby's memoranda and correspondence 
thus reveals that he was typical of the progressives who 
wished to influence China's development and that his 
proposals for reform were entirely consistent with the 
Open Door policy. Had Yuan Shih-k'ai sincerely desired 
the establishment of republican government, Willoughby's 
plans might have influenced China's development. Instead, 
Yuan attempted to restore imperial rule in China. More­
over, Willoughby's proposals were inconsistent with 
China's ancient Confucian scholar tradition and required 
wholesale adoption of western values. In short, Willoughby 
had little direct influence on either American Far Eastern 
policy or on China's development. His failure to export 
progressive reforms to China reminds us that America's 
ability to determine the development of other nations is 
limited and that a nation's political institutions must 
reflect its own history and culture.
WILLIAM F. WILLOUGHBY 
A PROGRESSIVE IN CHINA, 1914-1916
INTRODUCTION
In the first two decades of the twentieth century, 
entrepreneurs, educators, diplomats, missionaries, engi­
neers, and social workers travelled to China to exploit 
new markets and to "awake the sleeping Chinese" to western 
social, political, and economic ideas. Although it may 
appear at first glance that the interests of these 
travellers conflicted, such was not the case, for they all 
espoused mutually interdependent goals. The social or 
political reformers who wished to develop a modern republic 
in China knew that political and social progress depended 
upon the development of an economy which could pro.vide a 
decent standard of living for China's people. The entre­
preneurs who promoted economic development needed a stable 
government with a modern administrative system to protect 
their financial interests. Both the entrepreneurs and the 
reformers found friends among the diplomats, for a stable 
government was sorely needed in China to maintain the 
policy of the Open Door.
Among the Americans who travelled to China to promote 
her social, economic, and political progress was William 
Franklin Willoughby, deputy legal adviser to the President 
of the Republic of China, Yuan Shih-k’ai. Prior to his 
appointment as legal adviser, Willoughby had served as a
2
3member of the Taft Commission on Economy and Efficiency 
in Government, treasurer and then secretary of the Council 
of Puerto Rico, and assistant director of the Census 
Bureau. He had won considerable acclaim for his efforts 
to secure labor reform and introduce the techniques of 
scientific management to public administration.
His work in Peking from 1914 to 1916 provides a 
striking example of the convergence of the goals of the 
entrepreneur, the reformer, and the diplomat. Because he 
admired the political systems of Great Britain and the 
United States, he wanted very much to have China adopt a 
western model for her political development. He strongly 
believed that close diplomatic relations with the United 
States and successful American investments in China could 
encourage her development along western lines. In 
diplomacy, reform, and investment, Willoughby saw the tools 
to build a stable China, a country capable of resisting 
Japanese military and commercial encroachments while 
maintaining an open door to influence from the United 
Stat es .
The William F. Willoughby Papers in the Earl Gregg 
Swem Library of the College of William and Mary contain 
significant information about Willoughby's service as 
deputy legal adviser, including letters to his twin brother 
Westel and fifteen memoranda submitted to Yuan Shih-k'ai. 
These sources indicate that Willoughby was in many respects 
typical of the progressives who saw China as a new western
4frontier to which Americans could export political, social, 
and economic ideas and institutions.
Willoughby was, however, only one of several advisers 
to President Yuan Shih-k'ai, and Yuan's motives in seeking 
foreign advice were questionable. To evaluate Willoughby's 
term as an adviser, one must ask what he knew of China's 
political traditions, what effect his progressive orien­
tation had upon his advice, and whether his advice was 
realistic and valuable to the Chinese. In short, this 
thesis should .measure the impact of Willoughby's advice 
upon China's development.
The relationship between Willoughby and the United 
States' policy towards China also merits investigation.
The sources studied during preparation of this thesis 
suggest that Willoughby was not in any formal sense an 
agent of the United States' government. Nevertheless, 
Willoughby maintained close but informal contact with the 
American diplomatic community in Peking, and his advice to 
Yuan Shih-k'ai on both foreign and domestic matters was 
certainly consistent with State Department objectives. 
Therefore, an analysis of Willoughby's career as an adviser 
not only should include an evaluation of his impact on 
China but should determine if his position had any substan­
tive impact on American policy towards China and the Far 
East .
CHAPTER I 
THE AMERICAN FRONTIER MOVES WEST 
At the time of Willoughby1s appointment as legal 
adviser, China had long been beset by domestic rebellion 
and foreign exploitation. During the nineteenth century, 
poor imperial leadership and revolts like the great Taiping 
Rebellion of 1850-1864- had gravely weakened the authority 
of China's Manc.hu dynasty. By mid-century. Great Britain, 
France, and other western nations had used their superior 
military power to force China's acceptance of a series of 
commercial treaties. These "unequal treaties” had two 
unfortunate effects, from a Chinese point of view. First, 
the commercial and legal privileges granted to westerners 
undermined China’s sovereignty and threatened China with 
eventual dismemberment by the western powers. Second, 
the influx of western culture that accompanied trade 
intensified China's domestic turmoil and directly challenged 
the superiority of her political and social institutions.'*' 
Worried by the continued assaults upon China’s 
sovereignty and traditional values, many Chinese called 
for modernization and reform to meet the challenge posed 
by the West. Leaders such as Li Hung-chang, governor of
^John King Fairbank, The United States and China 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), p"I 147.
5
6Kiangsu Province, urged China to resist further encroach­
ments through "self-strengthening," an application of 
western technology to armaments, communications, and 
industry. The self-strengthening movement continued for 
thirty years, but China's attempts at modernization proved 
ineffective against nations which were anxious to expand 
their influence in Asia. In 1895 a modern, westernized 
Japan inflicted a humiliating defeat upon China and gained 
control of Korea. Japan's victory thoroughly discredited 
China's self-strengthening and opened her to new foreign 
demands for lucrative commercial concessions. The debacle 
of 1895 and the ensuing scramble for China's trade, rail­
roads, and mineral resources caused her intellectuals to
2demand more substantive reform.
The reform proposals of one intellectual, K 'ang Yu-wei,
won the attention of the Emperor Kuang-hsu. In the summer
of 1898, the emperor--under K'ang's tutelage--issued nearly
fifty decrees to reform China's administrative system. The
reforms were short-lived. In September, the conservatives
rallied around the Empress Dowager Tz'u-hsi, overthrew the
3
emperor, and reestablished a reactionary regime. Convinced 
that the Manchu court would not support progressive reform, 
many Chinese intellectuals -embraced revolution as the means
2 Ibid., pp. 176-177, 179.
Jerome Ch'en, Yuan Shih-k'ai, 1859-1916 (London: 
George Allen and Unwin, Lt d . , 1961 ), p~. 54 .
7to rid China of a bankrupt monarchy and save her from dis­
memberment . ^
The crisis in China coincided with crisis in the 
United States. The depression of 1892, the closing of the 
frontier in 1890, and the rapid industrialization of 
preceding decades convinced many Americans that the nation 
faced "market stagnation." Men of such diverse background 
as entrepreneur F. L. Stetson, populist Jerry Simpson, 
Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, and author Brooks Adams argued 
that America needed an overseas market to absorb its 
surplus manufactures. Without that market, the United 
States’ economy would collapse, and the ensuing economic 
dislocations would destroy American democratic institutions.
The Americans who believed that expansion would 
preserve democracy and prosperity frequently envisioned 
China as a promising market for surplus American goods. 
Senator William Frye of Maine expressed this sentiment 
when he asserted: "We must have the market [China] or we
shall have r e v o l u t i o n . T h e  New York State Chamber of 
Commerce, the National Association of Manufacturers, and 
the American Development Company also wanted immediate
^Immanuel C. Y. Hsu, The Rise of Modern China (New 
York: Oxford University PFes s', 1970), p. 539.
5
William A. Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy 
(New York: Dell Publishing Company, Inc.”, 1962 ), 24.
^Ibid., pp. 2 5-27.
8access to the China market as "the solution to the closed
7
frontier and industrial glut at home." The return of 
prosperity as the decade closed did not dim the vision of 
China as a consumer of American goods . Although China 
absorbed only three percent' of all United States exports 
in the 1890's, the American Asiatic Association continued 
to promote the China market well into the twentieth
g
century, long after Frye's specter of revolution faded.
Commercial interests were not alone in their desire
to carry the flag to China. Missionaries asked President
William McKinley for protection and support for their
9public schools. Robert LaFollette and Theodore Roosevelt 
believed that expansion would advance the cause of
10civilization by carrying Anglo-Saxon ideas to the world. 
Others, including Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan, argued 
that an expansionist foreign policy strengthened naval 
power and promoted national prestige. Still other Americans 
believed that the nation had a unique mission to spread 
the ideals of representative government throughout the
7Thomas McCormick, China Market: America's Quest for
Informal Empire (ChicagoT Quadrangle Books, 1967), pT 53- 
See also Jerry Israel, Progressives and the Open Door 
(Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1974), pp. 13-
15.
g
Paul Varg, "The Myth of the China Market, 1890-1914*M 
American Historical Review, 73 (Feb., 1968), 742-743-
9 tWarren Cohen, America's Response to China (New York:
John Wiley and Sons, 1971), p~! 54^
"^Williams, Tragedy, p. 57.
9w o r l d . T o  extend United States influence abroad,
Americans generally turned to commercial investments. As
historian David Healy noted, these non-economic reasons
for expansion fit into an "economic matrix," for the
expansionists tended to "equate national worth and vitality
12wrth economic success."
Once Americans recognized China as a potential area
for expansion, they began to worry that foreign powers
would dismember the hapless nation before the United States
13could enter the market on a competitive basis. Moreover,
both the United States and Great Britain saw in the 
scramble for concessions that was occurring a real threat 
to the balance of power in Asia. Recognizing that the 
United States did not have the military strength to impose 
its own order on the Far East, Secretary of State ‘John 
Hay and former Assistant Secretary W. W. Rockhill, with 
British help, circulated the first Open Door note on 
September 6, 1899.^ Many Americans were convinced that
the guarantee of a "fair field" in China would enable the 
United States to dominate the China market, and with
“^ Israel, Progressives, p. 12.
12David Healy, United States Expansionism (Madison: 
University of Wisconsin Press, 19VO)’, p3 1”?71
13Ibid., p . 165.
Willi 
pp. 134-137.
14- ams, Tragedy, p. 43; McCormick, China Market,
10
domination would come political stability and economic
 ^ v + 15 development.
Political stability and economic development, how­
ever, did not come quickly to China. Although Americans 
who wished to "awaken" the "sleeping Chinese" to western 
values were discouraged by the Boxer Rebellion in 1900, 
they were encouraged by the Manchu dynasty's promises of 
reform. In the wake of the rebellion, the court ordered 
a reorganization of China's administrative and educational 
systems and proposed a nine-year plan for implementation 
of a constitutional monarchy. In actuality, however, the 
decade of reorganization and reform did not significantly 
alter the authoritarian character of the Manchu government, 
and revolutionaries doubted the sincerity of the court's 
reform plans. They continued to agitate for the termi­
nation of Manchu rule and the establishment of a western
» /y , 16system of government.
In 1911, when the Manchu dynasty attempted to use the
fledgling national railroads as security for a loan,
revolt broke out in the province of Szechwan and rapidly
17spread across China. In a desperate attempt to win
1 5Israel, Progressives, p. 13; Cohen, America1s 
Response, p. 43.
"1 A
Ch'en, Yuan Shih-k'ai, p. 96.
1 7Ibid., pp. 108-109.
11
popular support and suppress the rebellion, the Manchus
hastily established a constitutional monarchy. On
November 1, the court appointed Yuan Shih-k’ai, a suc-
18cessful governor and popular general, as premier.
The man to whom the Manchus offered the premiership 
was one who easily recognized opportunity for personal 
advancement. A career military officer, Yuan Shih-k’ai 
had won considerable acclaim for his success in re­
organizing China ' s army after its humiliation in the Sino- 
19Japanese War. During the "Hundred Days" reforms, it
was he who informed the Empress Dov/ager of the reformers'
plans to rid the’ dynasty of her conservative influence.
This act of loyalty solidified the Empress’s confidence
20in Yuan, and he advanced rapidly under her patronage.
As provincial governor of Shantung in 1900, he shrewdly
recognized the Boxers' weakness and kept his province
21under control even as Peking exploded. As a result of 
his caution, he won praise from western powers as a 
capable leader. A year later, as viceroy of Chihli, Yuan 
developed a close personal following among the officers 
and men of the Peiyang Army and consolidated a power base
18 Rise of Modern China, p. 559.
"^Ch'en, Yuan Shih-k’ai, p. 52.
20Ibid., p . 62.
2 1Ibid., pp. 70-71.
12
22among leaders in North China.
Yuan's position was secure only as long as the Empress
Dowager lived. When she died in 1908, Yuan's enemies at
court schemed to remove him. Using the pretext of a foot
injury, Yuan left Peking in 1909 and did not participate
either in the last years of Manchu rule or in revolutionary 
23activity. Despite his enemies' scheming, he continued 
to exert influence over the northern army, which caused 
both the regent and the revolutionaries to bid for his 
support in 1911. By December of that year, Yuan entered 
peace negotiations with the revolutionaries who, by this 
time, had established a provisional government in Nanking 
under the leadership of Sun Yat-sen. The revolutionaries 
offered Yuan the presidency of the Chinese Republic, an 
invitation which caused Yuan to abandon the monarchy.
With his defection, the Manchus had little choice but to 
abdicate.2^
Although the revolutionaries elected Yuan to the 
presidency in February, 1912, many of them regarded him 
with well-placed suspicion. Before he agreed to step down 
as president, Sun Yat-sen sought pledges of Yuan's support
22Ibid., p. 73.
2 3Li Chien-nung, The Political History of China, 184-0- 
1928 (Stanford: Stanf or d University Press, 1956), p"! 229.
2 LHsu, Rise of Modern China, p. 562.
13
for constitutional government and his willingness to locate 
the capital at Nanking. Ominously, Yuan did not accept 
Nanking as the capital of the new republic. A well-timed 
army "revolt” gave him a pretext for establishing the 
capital within his own power base, Peking, and at the.
same time provided him with an opportunity to secure his
... 25own position.
Yuan further consolidated his power within the new
government by appointing military governors in the province
2 6and loyal supporters to important cabinet posts. The
Kuomintang, however, continued to dominate the National
Assembly. To weaken the party's power., Yuan began in 1913
27to replace Kuomingtang generals with his own men. When
dissident army members staged a second revolution in
July, 1913* Yuan had little difficulty destroying the
opposition. His triumph over the revolutionaries rein-
2 8forced his position as an unchallenged ruler.
The Kuomintang members of the National Assembly did 
not acquiesce in Yuan's accrual of power quietly. When 
Yuan tried to strengthen his position still further by 
negotiating a loan with a consortium of American, Japanese,
25Ch'en, Yuan Shih-k'ai, p. 134.
26Ibid., pp. 140-144; Hsu, Rise of Modern China, p. 564
27Ch'en, Yuan Shih-k'ai, p. 143.
28Ibid., pp. 167-169.
14
and European bankers, the Kuomintang refused to ratify 
the agreement. Yuan retaliated by ordering, or at least 
acquiescing in, the assassination of Sung Chiao-jen, a 
Kuomintang leader. He also enlisted the help of his 
military governors to secure the passage of a new
29constitution which greatly increased the president's power.
The Assembly attempted to check Yuan's growing power by
drafting yet another constitution which would establish a
30cabinet system of government.
Faced with such opposition, Yuan accused the 353
Kuomintang assemblymen of complicity in the summer's
revolution and revoked their credentials as members of the
National Assembly. Without the Kuomintang members, the
Assembly had no quorum and thus could not conduct business.
Yuan then dissolved the Assembly. This action, however,
did not result in the demise of the Kuomintang. Outlawed,
the party continued to carry on underground activities
31within China and from foreign countries.
Those Americans who had praised the 1911 Revolution
29
Ibid., pp. 158-163# 177. The consortium to which 
Yuan turned for a loan was called the Six-Power Consortium. 
It included banking interests from Great Britain, France, 
Germany, the United States, Russia, and Japan.
30Hsu, Rise of Modern China, p. 568.
31Ibid. See also Roy Curry, Woodrow Wilson and Far 
Eastern Policy, 1913-1921 (New York: Bookman Associates,
PJ57 y9— rrur.
15
and welcomed republicanism to China did not foresee Yuan
Shih-k'ai's swing towards absolutism. In 1912, the Outlook
reported that American reformers— the supporters of
Progressivism--hoped that the new republic would implement
progressive reforms. Lillian Wald, Horace Allen, and
E. A. Ross identified the 1911 Revolution with modernization,
3 ?democracy, reform, efficiency, and progress. Edward
Hume, the founder of the Yale-in-China medical school
program, claimed that the revolt "[threw] open wide the
doors of reform and progress in China." Hume wanted the
West to "give unselfishly . . in constructive assistance
3 3in any direction."
The elevation of Yuan Shih-k'ai to the presidency
had also met with enthusiastic responses. William Jennings
Bryan shipped an encyclopedia of Thomas Jefferson’s ideas
to Yuan and called him "the leader of the United States of 
34-China . " In 1915, William Francis Mannix, fresh from an 
interview with Yuan Shih-k'ai, reported in the Independent 
that Yuan's appearance and manner reminded -him of Theodore 
Roosevelt. Enthusiastically he passed along Yuan's 
assessment of China's progress: "It may be said to our
American friends that the new Republic of China is now
32Israel, Progressives, pp. 100-102.
3 3Quoted in Jonathan Spence, To Change China (Boston: 
Little, Brown, and Company, 1969), p . 164.
34Israel, Progressives, p. 101.
16
3 5fairly started on the right road." Another American, 
Sherwood Eddy, writing for World 1s Work, besides noticing 
the resemblance to Roosevelt, found parallels between Yuan's 
career and that of George Washington.^  In the eyes of 
both Mannix and Eddy, China was clearly making progress 
towards democracy and efficiency.
The Taft administration did not completely share the 
enthusiasm of the journalists and reformers. Since the 
circulation of the Open Door notes, the United States had 
desired the establishment of an effective Chinese govern­
ment, both to provide stability in Asia's balance of power
37and to allow United States' trade and investment in China. 
Taft wanted to promote the United States' influence there, 
but he tried to maintain the Open Door through partici­
pation in the Four-Power, and later the Six-Power, con­
sortium. Therefore, when the Chinese established a 
republic, Taft and Secretary of State Philander C. Knox 
hesitated to extend recognition. They feared that the 
Republie might fail to survive and that its collapse would 
touch off greater instability. Turmoil in China would 
then encourage further encroachment upon her sovereignty.
35William Francis Mannix, "The Chinese Republic 
Reports Progress," Independent, 83 (July 25, 1915), 114.
Sherwood Eddy, "An Interview with Yuan Shih-k'ai," 
World's Work, 29 (Mar., 1915), 535.
37
Cohen, America's Response, p. 74.
17
Moreover, Taft--ever the legalist--was reluctant to extend 
recognition while other consortium members waited for
•o 0
proof that the Republic could effectively govern China.
The issue still hung fire when Taft left office in 1913.
When Woodrow Wilson entered the White House, he
altered American strategy. Like Taft, he believed that
American culture and institutions could be promoted with
trade, but the consortium smacked too much of the "money
trust." Moreover, Wilson disliked American participation
in a consortium whose members had designs on China's 
39integrity. Consequently, he rejected the cooperative
approach and embarked on a unilateral effort to maintain 
the Open Door. The United States recognized the Republic 
of China on May 2, 1913, and later withdrew from the Six- 
Power consortium.
Wilson was willing to assist China morally and 
financially, but he would not provide any assistance to 
American entrepreneurs which would threaten China's 
sovereignty. Indeed, as historian Tien-yi Li pointed out, 
Wilson believed that the United States had a Christian 
mission in the Far East: "the principlesof order, justice,
character, liberty, and good government should be taught 
to politically undisciplined peoples in that region." He
^Charles Vevier, The United States and China, 1906- 
1913 (New York: Greenwood Press-, 1968 ), pp. 203-207.
3 9Ibid., pp. 207-210.
18
also believed that China should adopt American political 
forms. But first., China had to develop a strong central 
government to control internal disorder. In time, as 
American influence and commerce helped to stabilize China
internally, Wilson believed that democracy would take
+ 40 root.
The president's belief that democracy, progress, and 
reform would come to China in the twentieth century was 
shared by many Americans. Indeed, American-sponsored 
reform efforts in China predated the establishment of the 
Republic. President Theodore Roosevelt had dispatched 
educator Charles' Conant, political scientist Jeremiah W. 
Jenks, and labor expert Hugh Hanna to China to devise a 
plan for monetary reform/^ The 1911 Revolution sparked 
renewed efforts to bring modern, western ideas to "John 
Chinaman." D. Willard Lyon and the YMCA pushed for improve­
ment of sanitation, prison reform, and the creation of 
42parks. The American journalist and evangelist Sherwood
Eddy pointed to the Chinese government's war on opium as 
evidence of "moral reform." For Eddy and the other 
Americans, the "yellow peril" had become "the golden
^^Tien-yi Li. Woodrow Wilson's China Policy: 1913-
1917 (New York: Octagon Books, 1969 ), p p . 163-164, 2 03- 203.
41Israel, Progressives, pp. 16-17.
^Ibid.. , pp. 22-23.
/ o
opportunity of the West."
Well before the end of the Manchu dynasty, missionaries 
and university men had already established the University 
of Nanking, Hangchow Christian College, and Yale-in-China. 
to bring civilization and "a progressive, stable govern­
ment" to China. Yale's efforts were matched by Princeton- 
in-China and later, by Wisconsin-in-China, which represented 
the Progressive view of governmental reform.^ Americans 
were pleased with these efforts to educate young Chinese; 
they were convinced that a western education of leaders 
was crucial to the creation of a modern China.
Some American progressives went to China to promote 
reforms similar to those being promoted in the United 
States. Gifford Pinchot, for example, encouraged 
conservation of Chinese rivers and forests. Other 
conservation experts and engineer's recommended the intro­
duction of efficient administrative techniques as a 
prerequisite for political and commercial progress. Dr.
Paul S. Reinsch, American minister to China, and other 
experts such as Dr. Frank J. Goodnow of Columbia University, 
advocated political reforms along American lines.
Yuan Shih-k’ai was not unreceptive to offers of
^^Eddy, "An Interview with Yuan Shih-k’ai," 536-537. 
^Israel, Progressive s, pp. 18-19, 113.
^5Ibid., p. 20, 123.
20
American aid in government reform, since he hoped that
friendly relations with western nations would win loans
for China. To gain such support, Yuan employed a number
of foreign advisers and maintained favorable connections
46with the American press. In 1913, while visiting China,
Dr. Charles W. Eliot, president of Harvard, learned of
Yuan's desire for an American adviser and apparently
informed the Chinese that the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace was willing to nominate experts for
the position. The nomination of Dr. Frank Goodnow, a law
professor at Columbia,as legal adviser was accepted by
the Republic of China. Goodnow served in China until the
summer of 1914, when he accepted the presidency of Johns
4 7Hopkins University. At that time he returned to the 
United States but retained his title. Goodnow was replaced 
in Peking by William Franklin Willoughby, who was officially
designated as deputy legal adviser to the Republic of China.
The Americans who enthusiastically hailed the revolution 
of 1911 perhaps realized that China was merely a nominal 
republic. Nevertheless, Willoughby and other American 
reformers were confident that they could affect change in 
China, help her develop into a modern, republican state, 
and expand United States' influence in the Far East. But
^Ch'en, Yuan Shih-k'ai, p. 173. 
^ I b i d . , pp. 203-204.
21
traditional China had not completely disappeared in the 
turmoil of the past century, and her leaders did not 
agree on the type of government China needed. To graft 
western democracy onto a tradition of authoritarian rule, 
and to stabilize a country in the midst of sweeping change 
would prove exceedingly difficult, even for men of 
Willoughby's experience and ability.
CHAPTER II 
THE EDUCATION OF A NEW CHINA HAND
Only forty-seven years old at the time of his appoint­
ment as deputy legal adviser, William F. Willoughby was 
well-known in academic and government circles as a scholar, 
diplomat, and administrator. Like many of his contempora­
ries of the Progressive Era', Willoughby was very much aware 
of the massive social and economic dislocations that 
accompanied the emergence of an urban, industrial America.
He, too, recognized that government had to change as the 
society and economy changed in order to cope with industri­
alization and urbanization. In the first decades of the 
tv/entieth century, Willoughby's reform activities, 
especially the introduction of scientific management 
techniques to government, won him substantial recognition.
An acknowledged expert in the field of public administration, 
Willoughby was very much a logical choice to fill the 
advisory post left vacant by Goodnow's departure from 
China.
The son of a Washington, D. C. judge, Willoughby was 
graduated from Johns Hopkins University in 1888. Newspaper 
clippings and personal records revealed a young man 
remarkably similar to Frank Merriwell stereotype--both 
he and.his twin brother Westel were serious students and
22
23
talented athletes. While still an undergraduate concen­
trating in political science, he and his brother co­
authored a government textbook for the Washington, D.C., 
public schools. Three years later, he undertook a study 
of the French and Prussian civil service systems for the 
United States commissioner of education. In 1894, after 
completing his post-graduate studies at Johns Hopkins, 
Willoughby was appointed a statistical expert to the 
Department of Labor.1
The year in which Willoughby entered the department 
was marked by labor turmoil. Only months before his 
appointment, Coxey’s Army of unemployed had marched on the 
nation’s capital, and the Pullman strike shook the nation.
As an employee of the Department of Labor, Willoughby 
encountered first-hand the massive social and economic 
dislocations that accompanied the industrial depression of 
1893-98. But like many Americans, he welcomed the new 
industrial age. He did not regard the formation of giant 
industrial combinations as either inherently evil or un­
natural. In an 1898 article for the Yale Review, Willoughby
argued that the formation of trusts was a natural result,
* 2
a "normal evolution of industry.” Combinations could
1
For clippings relating to William F. Willoughby's 
Johns Hopkins years, see the Willoughby Papers, Box 1, 
Folder 1, Earl Gregg Swem Library, College of William and 
Mary .
2William F. Willoughby, "Concentration of Industry m  
the United States," Yale Review, 7 (May, 1898), 82, 
Willoughby Papers, Box 7.
provide positive benefits: the trusts often encouraged
innovative and efficient use of resources, and they brought 
stability and predictability to the marketplace. Nor did 
combinations inevitably pose a threat to the worker, 
since large firms might be more capable of providing 
benefits to workers than small firms. Attempts to halt 
the natural process of concentration, he believed, were
3"doomed to failure" and were "thoroughly retrogressive."
Willoughby’s identification of concentrated economic 
power with progress was not 'altogether unqualified. In 
language which foreshadowed the "New Nationalism" of 
Theodore Roosevelt, he noted that only "normal" concentra­
tions could honestly be praised, but "forced concentration" 
to achieve higher prices led to abuse. Indeed, Willoughby 
argued that "the public should not be left at the mercy 
of a few men." To prevent abuse, he proposed two counter­
weights to the power of corporations: a conservative
trade union movement and a degree of government regulation.^ 
Although Willoughby did not propose specific regulatory 
measures, he did argue, as did others in the Progressive 
Era, that the application of proper management and 
administrative techniques could control the chaos and abuse 
that accompanied rapid industrialization. Proper
3Ibid., 92-93. 
hbid., 93-94.
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administration was more than a means to an end; to
Willoughby, it became an end in itself. Good government
rested upon sound and efficient administration.
The article for the Yale Review not only expressed
Willoughby's opinion concerning the desirability of
concentration but also revealed his long-standing concern
for improved working conditions in the nation’s industries.
During his post-graduate studies, Willoughby had received
two prizes from the American Economic Association for his
essays, ’’Housing for the Poor in Cities" and "Child 
5
Labor." While a statistical expert for the Department of 
Labor, he served as a representative of the United States 
to international conferences on labor accidents, workmen's 
compensation laws, and housing.^ Willoughby's interest in 
labor problems continued long after he left the department. 
Some time after 1900, he served as president of the 
American Association for Labor Legislation, identified by 
historian Arthur Link as one of the "more radical" Pro-
7
gressive groups "dedicated to the cause of social justice."
a
See Chicago Tribune, January 24, 1891, and an un­
identified newspapeT clipping, Willoughby Papers, Box 1, 
Folder 1.
^Carroll D. Wright to Willoughby, February 20, 1900, 
and W. Q. Graham to all diplomatic and consular officers, 
August, 1894, ibid. , Box 1, Folder 2.
7
Arthur Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era 
(New York: Harper and Row, Tor chbooks, 1954 ), p~! 54.
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The word radical, of course, has different shades of 
meaning. But to Willoughby, the solution to labor problems 
lay in the promotion of trade unionism, mediation, and 
appropriate labor legislation. He revealed his essentially 
moderate approach in a 1901 article for Current Encyclo­
pedia , in which he praised the efforts of the National 
Civil Federation to promote arbitration of major labor
g
disputes. The Federation, according to historian James
Weinstein, hardly advocated the destruction of corporate
capitalism; rather, its objective was to "stabilize the
relationship between the work force and the corporate 
9
enterprise."
The American Association for Labor Legislation was no 
hotbed of radicalism either. Founded by middle class 
reformers and financed by John D. Rockefeller and Elbert 
Gary, the Association worked to win acceptance of labor 
reforms and did achieve some successes.^ In 1916,
Congress passed the Kern-McGillicudy Act to provide work­
man's compensation for federal employees. As president 
of the AALL, Willoughby had actively participated in the 
Association's efforts to secure such legislation. Upon
William F. Willoughby, "Conciliation and Arbitration," 
Current Encyclopedia, August 1901, Willoughby Papers, Box 7.
9
James Weinstein, The Corporate Ideal in the Liberal 
State, 1900-1906 ( Boston! Beacon Press , 1966), pp . 3*7-39 .
10Ibid., p. 48.
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his departure from China, the New York Times noted that
Willoughby had "insistently demanded laws requiring better
11hours and working conditions for women and children."
His participation in labor reform in the years prior to
1916 clearly identified Willoughby with those Progressives
] 2
actively engaged in social and economic reform.
In September, 1900, Willoughby accepted an instructor-
ship in economics at Harvard University. He did not remain
long in Cambridge, however, for in 1901, President Theodore
13Roosevelt appointed him treasurer of Puerto Rico.
Willoughby remained on the island until 1909, serving as 
treasurer, secretary, and then acting governor. During 
these eight years, Willoughby overhauled the island's 
financial and administrative systems and reorganized 
municipal governments.
At the core of Willoughby's work in Puerto Rico was a 
philosophy of government which not only placed him squarely 
in the mainstream of Progressive thought, but also strongly 
influenced his later recommendations to China. Central to
11Link, Woodrow Wilson, p. 226; New York Times, July 
13, 1914. : ~
12Link, V/oodrow Wilson, p. 54.
^J. H. Gore to William F. Willoughby, March 31, 1900; 
Allen Danforth to Willoughby, September 27, 1900; and
Treasury Department to Willoughby, November 7, 1901, 
Willoughby Papers, Box 1, Folder 2.
14Clipping from the Daily Princetonian, February 26, 
1910, ibid., Box 1, Folder 2T
Willoughby's reorganization of the island's government was 
the creation of a Competent, well-trained, and impartial 
civil service. A professional civil service had long 
been regarded as a means of curbing "bossism" and cor­
ruption within the American political system, and 
V/illoughby ’ s creation of a civil service for Puerto Rico 
was intended to serve much the same purpose. But to 
reformers such as Willoughby, E. L. Godkin, and Frank J. 
Goodnow, the divorce of politics from the administration 
of government was more than an insurance policy against 
corruption: it became a means of establishing a "more
scientific," "more efficient" government. The use of 
"experts" resulted not only in good government at the 
lowest possible cost but also in a government capable of
resolving the complex social and economic problems of an
15urban, industrial society.
According to historian Samuel Haber, it was Frank 
Goodnow who most effectively articulated the need to sepa­
rate government administration from politics. Willoughby 
supported wholeheartedly Goodnow's belief that professional 
administration would provide better government. "The 
government best administered is best," he wrote.^ He
15Samuel Haber, Efficiency and Uplift (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1964 5, pp. 101-103, 107.
i s
Ibid., pp. 105-106.
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considered himself an expert, a specialist who could use
his knowledge and scientific methods to work for the good
of the nation. So convinced was he of the dangers of
mixing politics with administration that there is no
record of his ever having cast a ballot in a presidential 
17election.
Willoughby’s eight years in Puerto Rico gave him a
remarkable opportunity to turn ideas into substance. He
not only established a civil service for the island but
reorganized its taxation and accounting systems. He
regarded his effort to transplant progressive ideas to
Puerto Rico as successful, for he wrote:
. . . there was secured a service of
greater efficiency than many believed 
possible to secure from one manned 
exclusively by native inhabitants of 
the Island.^
Through his brother Westel, Willoughby received word 
of Goodnow's interest in the reorganization of Puerto 
Rico’s government. In a letter to Goodnow at the close of 
his term, Willoughby remarked that the American initiation
17This information is not easily confirmed, and 
Willoughby’s failure to vote might have been due to the 
fact that he was a resident of Washington, D. C., for most 
of his life. From an interview with William Westel 
Willoughby, Bohun Farm, Mathews, Virginia, July 31, 1974.
1SWilliam F. Willoughby, "Memorandum on Some Factors 
Involved in Securing Efficiency in the Organization of the 
Personnel in Government Service," p. 10,* Willoughby 
Papers, Box 5, Folder 42.
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of the civil service system had rescued sixty-six cities
from bankruptcy and provided Puerto Rican citizens with
19"works of permanent public utility.” As a member of
the Council of Puerto Rico, Willoughby's progressive
ideas merged nicely with American imperialism. He had
worked diligently to bring civilization, justice, and
efficiency to backward peoples.
Although Willoughby regarded his work in Puerto Rico
as challenging, he left the island at the end of his
second term to accept an appointment as assistant director
20of the Census Bureau. His appointment and that of the 
director, E. Dana Durand, were hailed as major steps towards 
securing scientific management and efficiency in govern­
ment, because the appointments in the past had been part 
of the patronage system. Review of Reviews praised both 
Willoughby and. Durand as "university-trained specialists,"
and Willoughby was singled out specifically as a "university 
21type." The creation of a permanent Census Bureau seemed
a successful implementation of the Progressives' "Wisconsin 
22Idea."
19William F1. Willoughby to Frank J. Goodnow, Jan. 9, 
1909, Frank J. Goodnow Papers, Manuscript Collection, Johns 
Hopkins University Library.
20Interview with William W. Willoughby, Bohun Farm, 
Mathews, Virginia, July 31, 1974.
21Clipping from Review of Reviews, Sept. 1909, 
Willoughby Papers, Box 1, Folder 1.
22Haber, Efficiency, p. 106.
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Two years later, Willoughby returned to the problem
of government reorganization when he joined the Taft
‘Commission on Economy and Efficiency in Government. As a
member of the Commission, Willoughby came into close
contact with other government administrators and experts
on administration and finance. The Commission’s chairman,
Frederick Cleveland, had long been associated with New
York’s Bureau of Municipal Research, an organization which
promoted the application of the techniques of scientific
management to city and state problems. Frank Goodnow,
then a professor of law at Columbia University, also was
23a member of the six-member commission.
The reforms recommended by Willoughby and the other 
members were essentially administrative, in keeping with 
the philosophy that efficient government could best be' 
achieved through personnel and procedural alterations. 
Specifically, the Commission pressed for the adoption of 
proper budget procedures as a method of setting government 
priorities. The Commission also recommended the creation 
of a central administrative agency, very much like the 
present Office of Management and the Budget, to control 
both the personnel and the operation of government 
departments.^
The commission’s recommendations fell upon deaf ears.
2^Ibid . , pp. 110-112.
2^Ibid., pp. 113-H4-.
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Congress did nothing to act upon them during Taft's
administration, and when Wilson entered office, the
recommendations were laid aside. The commission's work
was not totally wasted, however, for some of the reforms
2 5were actually initiated at the municipal level. More­
over, Willoughby received considerable attention in the 
press for his work, and in 1920 he mounted a successful 
campaign for the institution of a national budget system. 
His experience on the Taft Commission also influenced 
his work in China. Throughout his term, he urged the 
Chinese to draw up budgets for the operation of every 
level of government.
At the conclusion of the commission's work, Goodnow 
had returned to Columbia, departing for China in the fall 
of 1913. Willoughby had left Washington for Princeton' 
University, where he became McCormick Professor of Juris­
prudence. In 1914; he received his appointment as deputy
2 6legal adviser to President Yuan Shih-k'ai.
Although the specific circumstances surrounding 
Willoughby’s appointment are not known, one may reasonably 
surmise that his reputation as an administrator and his 
association with Goodnow over the years influenced his 
nomination for the post. State Department dispatches only
25Ibid., p. 116.
2 6Secretary of Princeton University to William F. 
Willoughby, June 10, 1912, Willoughby Papers, Box 1, 
Folder 1. See also newspaper clippings,. Box 1, Folder 2.
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indicate that the nomination of Goodnow’s successor was
handled by the Carnegie Endowment in the same manner as
27Goodnow's original appointment.
The response of Willoughby's Princeton colleagues to 
his appointment was enthusiastic, and it revealed some­
thing of the prevailing American attitudes toward China. 
Fascinated by the idea of advising a nation of 400 million 
citizens, Professor Robert McElroy declared that the office 
of constitutional adviser "appeals to the imagination as 
few positions can." Noting that "a giant nation" had 
turned to Willoughby for advice on the establishment of a 
representative government, McElroy compared him to an
ambassador with "plenary powers to interpret the ideas
2 8of the West to the minds of the East."
The Daily Princetonian emphasized the importance of 
Willoughby's position as adviser, noting that he would 
"guide the organization of the government itself." He 
would advise the Chinese on presidential powers, the 
.formation of the "central Parliament or Congress," and the 
establishment of the executive departments. "In fact," the 
newspaper concluded, "he will have the most important and
27J. B. Moore, Counselor, to James Brown Scott, 
vSecretary of the Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, Jan. 24, 1914, United States Department of State 
Decimal File, 893.01A/22.
2 8Robert McNutt McElroy, in an unidentified article, 
Willoughby Papers, Box 1, Folder 1.
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responsible part in the great work of creating a new
29government for one of the greatest nations in the world."
The New York Times and the Boston Herald reminded readers
of Willoughby's work with government reorganization and 
30labor reform. Clearly, the reform impulse in America
was not confined within national borders; progressive
reforms could be carried to China. China would benefit
immeasurably from American willingness to help her develop
representative government.
The China that Willoughby and his family found upon
their arrival on October 13, 1914 belied the optimism of
McElroy and the Daily Princetonian. In January, 1914,
after he dissolved China's National Assembly, Yuan Shih-
k'ai virtually ruled alone. Only a sixty-nine member-
31Political Council functioned as his adviser. In order
to maintain his legitimacy, Yuan called a National 
Conference in March, 1914 to draw up a provisional consti­
tution. The finished document, promulgated May 1, 1914, 
gave Yuan extraordinary power over appointments and 
legislation. The constitution was ostensibly drafted 
with the assistance of Frank Goodnow, who afterwards
29Daily Prince t o m a n , n.d., ibid. , Box 1, Folder 2.
30New York Times, July 13, 1914; and Boston Herald, 
July 14, 1914, ibid., Box 1, Folder 1.
^Jerome Ch'en, Yuan Shih-k'ai, 1&59-1916 (London: 
George Allen and Unwin^ Ltd . , 1961 J, 178..
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32returned to the United States.
The New York Times found the new constitution "remark­
able for the powers of administration it confers upon the 
3 3president." An editorial in Outlook lamented the
"reactionary" nature of the new constitution because it
34placed so much power in the president's hands. Goodnow,
however, was not disappointed with the document, at least
publicly. Although he admitted upon his return that the
president's powers were extensive, he also noted that the
Chinese legislature was not too weak to check the executive.
He reminded those who were dissatisfied with the constitution
that it was merely a provisional document, until the
transition to a representative form of government could be 
35effected. In reality, Yuan Shih-k'ai never called the
legislature into being. The Council of State (Ts 1 an-cheng 
Yuan), a consultative body, acted in its place until the 
monarchial movement was well under way. Yuan's power to
o  /
rule China was practically unchecked.
En route to China, Willoughby met many diplomats, 
businessmen, and correspondents who were familiar with
^ New York Times, May 2, 1914-.
^ Ibid.
^"China," Outlook, 107 (July 4, 1914), 523-524. 
35 Frank J. Goodnow, in New York Times, June 22, 1914. 
^.Ch'en, Yuan Shih-k'ai, p. 179.
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conditions there. They were, on the whole, pessimistic 
about, the chances for "decent government." After extensive 
conversations with them, Willoughby concluded that the 
establishment of a "good government" in China would be
more difficult than in either the Philippines or Puerto
37 Rico . ^
Upon his arrival in Peking, Willoughby discovered that
the situation was more precarious than he imagined. The
war had cut off China from European loans., weakening her
financial stability; furthermore, the Japanese seizure of
German territory in China severely strained Sino-Japanese
relations. Nevertheless, his first audience with Yuan
Shih-k'ai was auspicious. Yuan was "strong, bright, and
genial-looking," he reported, and able to "bear his
39responsibilities without undue worry." Willoughby 
also established cordial relations with the American 
community in Peking, but he was careful to maintain a 
discreet relationship with American Minister Paul S. 
Reinsch-. To his brother Westel he wrote, "My relations 
with the Legation should not be so close as to obscure 
in any way the fact that I am a Chinese and not an American
^7W. F. Willoughby to Westel Willoughby, Sept. 23, 
1914, Willoughby Papers, Box 5, Folder 33.
^^W. F. Willoughby to Westel, Oct. 13, 1914, ibid.
39W. F. Willoughby to Westel, Oct. 29, 1914, ibid.
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official."^°
For nearly three weeks after his arrival, much of 
Willoughby's time was spent in formal calls in the Legation 
Quarter, sight-seeing, and conversations with diplomats 
and newsmen. His impressions of Peking were very much 
like those of any Westerner. The beauty of the Chinese 
palaces and the colorful street scenes were frequently 
mentioned in letters to his brother and sister. As he 
travelled in Peking, Willoughby found cause for optimism..
On a drive with Reinsch, he took heart from Chinese 
playing western sports: "I believe this matter of sports
is of far-reaching importance--it brings out the idea of 
strenuous contest without the necessity for hostile 
feeling .
Even the age-old problem of corruption did not seem
an insurmountable barrier to progress. Willoughby noted
with satisfaction that there was in China "a general
desire" to "lessen this evil," and added bluntly that
Americans could hardly criticize the Chinese for corruption
in government. Surely, he felt, corruption could be
controlled through "proper administrative systems for the
42collection of revenue and the auditing of expenditures."
^9W. F. Willoughby to Westel, Oct. 13, 1914, ibid.
« W. F. Willoughby to Alice, Oct. 18, 1914, ibid.
^ W . F. Willoughby to Westel, Oct. 29, 1914, ibid.
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Unfortunately, the first memoranda which Yuan Shih-k’ai
requested of Willoughby did not deal with administrative
reform or constitutional revision, but with the effect
of World War I on China. Willoughby cited racism,
nationalism, and imperialism as the roots of that conflict
but, like the Anglophile he was, he placed the blame for
the war squarely on Germany and Austria. Predicting a
protracted conflict that would greatly alter the balance
of power in the Far East, Willoughby urged China to
protect its territorial integrity and give no nation an
excuse to intervene militarily in Chinese affairs. He
also urged Yuan to begin the process of modernizing China
4-3even as the war continued.
As to financial and diplomatic assistance, Willoughby 
concluded that Yuan had to look to the United States, the 
sole major power with a "keen interest and sympathy" in 
the development of a stable, representative government. 
Warning that Russia, Germany, and particularly Japan wanted 
to extend their influence and territory in China, Willoughby 
pressed Yuan to recognize that Japan might try to make 
China "more or less an autonomous dependency" while the 
European powers were at war. Consequently, China had to 
create a stable government, because Japan would use any 
evidence of internal instability as an excuse for
W. F-. Willoughby, "The War, Its Causes, and More 
Important Consequences Likely to Result from It," Nov. 
1914, i/bid., Box 3, Folder 42.
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intervention. She might even go so far as to stir up 
insurrections to provide an excuse.^
Willoughby followed up this lengthy memorandum with 
another on the seizure of Kiaochow by Japan. The seizure, 
he argued, was perfectly justified as long as Japan and 
Germany were at war; but the rights associated with the 
lease did not devolve automatically to Japan upon Kiachow's 
surrender, nor did Japan have the right to permanent
/ 5
occupation of the territory.
In the last of the three memoranda on the war, Willoughby 
argued that China, had the right of representation at the 
peace conference since "her territory has been made the 
theatre of military operations." This was especially 
important because the peace conference would handle the 
belligerents* claims in China. Therefore, Yuan had to 
insure that China had a voice, if not equal status with 
the belligerents at the conference
Although Willoughby was not an employee of the State 
Department, his suspicion of Japan's seizure of the German 
leaseholds in China was shared by many Americans, including 
Paul Reinsch. President Wilson and Secretary of State
/
W. F. Willoughby, "Memorandum on the Surrender of 
Kiaochow by Japan to China," Dec. 1914, ibid.
L 6W. F. Willoughby, ''Memorandum on the Representation 
of China in. the Conference to Determine the Terms of Peace 
on the Conclusion of the Present War," Dec. 1914, ibid.
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Bryan also feared that Japanese encroachments upon China’s
4 7sovereignty posed a very real threat to the Open Door. 
Willoughby recognized, however, that the United States 
was preoccupied with European problems and would not risk
/ n
war to block Japan’s ambitions. However, by pressing
Yuan to'stabilize China internally and by promoting the
United States as the country most likely to aid China's
political and economic development, he was certainly
trying to guarantee that China would remain open to
American influence.
The seizure of Kiaochow was very much a warning of
future trouble. Towards the end of the year, the Japanese
strengthened their garrisons in Manchuria and demanded that
all Germans in China's customs service be replaced with 
49Japanese.
It was not until December, 1914, that Yuan Shih-k’ai 
requested the first memorandum on China's political 
problems. The request was somewhat unusual because in 
the memorandum Willoughby analyzed the causes of political 
unrest in Mexico under the Diaz regime. In a letter to his
47
Roy Curry, Woodrow Wilson and Far Eastern Policy,
1913-1921 (New York-* Bookman Associates, 1957 ), p~i 1$7; 
Arthur Link, Struggle for Neutrality (Princeton: Princeton
University Press", I960”), pp. 193-19&.
4 8Link, Struggle for Neutrality, pp. 267-268. See 
also Curry, Woodrow Wilson, p. 110.
^Link, ibid. , pp. 268-269.
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brother Westel, Willoughby admitted that "one could read 
between the lines" of the memorandum to see that he was 
in fact drawing a parallel between Mexico's and China's 
experiences with republican government. Willoughby was 
convinced that Yuan wanted to use Diaz's experience as a
50"justification" to make himself "a second Diaz" in China.
In the memorandum, Willoughby noted that Mexico provided 
an "important experiment" in republican government because 
it illustrated the difficulties of establishing a republic 
government in a country with no history of self-rule.
Diaz initially was successful because he ended disorder 
in Mexico "with an iron hand" and encouraged the "material 
progress" of the country. Mexico's "rapid development," 
Willoughby reminded Yuan, was due to the "scrupulous care" 
taken by Diaz "to protect foreigners and their investment
50W. F. Willoughby to Westel, Dec. 10, 22, 1914, 
Willoughby Papers, Box 5, Folder 35.. Porfirio Diaz seized 
power in Mexico in 1876. Although he was always careful 
to maintain the form of Mexico's constitution, he changed 
it to permit his re-election as president for six successive 
terms and generally ruled as a dictator. His attempt to 
imprison a popular rival provoked a violent revolution, 
which forced his resignation in 1911. Although he promoted 
economic development and restored internal order, his 
refusal to abide by the spirit of the constitution angered 
many Mexicans and eventually contributed to his downfall.
Had Diaz worked to implement republican government, 
historians might have seen him as a progressive leader 
rather than one of a number of dictators (Harold E. Davies, 
Revolutionaries, Traditionalists, and Dictators in Latin 
America [New York”: Co ope r Square Publications , Inc . , I"97 3 ] ,
pp. 163-171, passim). Sadly, Yuan Shih-k'ai did not accept 
Willoughby's advice. In 1915, his supporters used Diaz as 
a justification for restoration of a monarchy in China.
42
51m  the country."
Despite promising beginnings, Diaz's regime foundered,
and Willoughby drew two lessons from its wreckage. Part
of Mexico's political instability stemmed from Diaz's
failure to advance "the individual well-being" of the
Mexican citizens. The concentration of wealth in a few
hands had undermined the nation's stability. Even the
United States, Willoughby noted, had undertaken "social
reforms . . . directed towards correcting this evil."
More importantly, Diaz had been unwilling to square his
rule with Mexico's commitment to republican government.
To be sure, the lack of a tradition of self-rule, an
educated population, and a consensus on the forms of
government might necessitate strong rule by one person as
an interim measure; but an autocratic government under a
republican form either had to create conditions favorable
to the establishment of a republic or risk instability
52and loss of power. Willoughby's message to Yuan was
clear: autocratic rule would not bring permanent stability
to China. A ruler committed to China's best interests 
would work to establish a stable, progressive republic.
If Yuan received little sympathy from Willoughby for 
the establishment of an autocracy in China, he gained
51 . .W. F. Willoughby, "Memorandum on Political Conditions
and Problems in Mexico," Dec. 1914, ibid., Box 5, Folder 42.
52T1_Ibid.
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considerable support for his attack on the Kuomintang 
Party. Addressing himself to the role of political 
parties in modern government, Willoughby again stressed 
the need for Yuan to commit himself to republic government. 
He wrote:
China has definitely adopted the principle 
of popular government as a political ideal 
towards the achievement of which her efforts 
will be directed.53
However, Willoughby concluded that China was still in a
"formative period," not yet completely ready for either
full popular government or the constructive operation of
5 4-political parties.
The task of Yuan Shih-k'ai's government, Willoughby 
asserted, was to develop the conditions necessary for the 
successful operation of a republic. Until consensus was 
reached on the exact form of government for China, and 
until popular government was close to reality, political 
parties should be restricted. Willoughby recognized the 
danger of his advice but emphasized that it was not to 
be construed to mean that public opinion should not be 
heeded by the government. In fact, he encouraged Yuan to 
work for the development of public opinion, to allow for 
"complete publicity" of all official acts, and even to 
permit criticism of the government. Government, he argued,
5 3W. F. Willoughby, "Memorandum on the Place of Political 
Parties in a Constitutional Government," Dec. 1914, ibid.
^Ibid .
should be accountable to the people and open in all its
dealing with them Mto lessen the dangers inherent in the
5 5centralization of power."
Both the memorandum on Mexico and the memorandum on
political parties demonstrated Willoughby's desire for
eventual republican government in China, but both expressed
his conviction that China in 1914 was not ready for such
a governmental system. In his memorandum on political
parties, Willoughby listed the conditions he deemed
critical for the operation of popular government: a
homogenous population, a degree of national feeling, basic
agreement on the form of government, respect for legal
authority, experience in self-government, and freedom of
public expression. These conditions did not yet exist 
• . 56m  China. In this context, Willoughby shared Goodnow1s 
appraisal of political conditions in China, and, like 
Goodnow, he wanted a strong central government to serve as 
a transition to the establishment of a republic.
In conclusion, Willoughby's opinions on China's 
government, particularly on the role of political parties, 
were clearly influenced by his experience in Puerto Rico, 
to which he often referred in his memoranda. He believed 
that political parties in Puerto Rico were irresponsible
45
factions, serving more to disrupt the government than to 
provide a means of popular expression. Furthermore, he 
associated parties with the spoils system, which he
57regarded as a threat to efficient, scientific government.
Willoughby did not quarrel with a party's active
formulation and expression of public opinion, but he
believed that the execution of policy should be left to
trained experts who would act impartially in the public's
interests. Curbing the excesses of parties did not
preclude progress towards popular government but enhanced
it. Both in Puerto Rico and the Philippines, military
governments had provided an orderly, stable environment
for the development of popular government. A similar type
of government, firm but not repressive, would provide, the
stability needed in China for the development of truly
5 grepublican institutions. Unfortunately for Willoughby,
Yuan Shih-k'ai had no desire to nurture these conditions 
for a successful republic, and his efforts to steer China 
in that direction had little effect.
CHAPTER III 
PLANS FOR AN EFFICIENT CHINA
William Willoughby knew at the time of his arrival in 
Peking that the establishment of a strong national govern­
ment was crucial to the creation of a modern China. Thus, 
as his memoranda on Diaz of Mexico and the role of political 
parties indicated, he was not opposed to the concentration 
of power in Yuan Shih-k'ai's hands, as long as the president 
remained committed to republican principles. If Yuan 
Shih-k'ai successfully established Peking's control of 
the country, Willoughby reasoned, he could then begin.work 
on the reforms Willoughby considered most important for 
China's development: a complete reorganization of her
civil service, audit and budget procedures, and taxation 
system. Events, however, soon forced Willoughby to postpone 
his work. In the opening weeks of 1915, both he and the 
Chinese were preoccupied with rumors of a restoration of 
the monarchy and' feverish consideration of the Twenty- 
One Demands.
In August, 1914, the Council of State announced that 
the country needed a new presidential election law to 
repair "defects" in the election procedure established by 
the provisional constitution. In December, Yuan Shih-k'ai 
promulgated the new law, which lengthened the president's
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term of office from five to ten years and set no limits 
on the number of terms the president could serve. If, at 
the end of his term, the Council of State decided that 
internal conditions were unsuitable for an election, the 
president could continue in office without the formality 
of an election. If the Council decided that the country 
was stable and elections could take place, a one-hundred 
member electoral college would elect the president from a 
list of three candidates chosen by the incumbent.^
This procedure virtually assured that Yuan Shih-kTai
could serve as president for as many terms as he wished
and could even designate his son as his successor. Since
the president appointed the Council of State and had
filled it with his supporters, it was highly doubtful
that the Council would refuse to follow his wishes- in
deciding to hold an election. Since the Council of State
appointed at least fifty members of the electoral college,
even an election would result in Yuan’s continuance in
office. If he wished to name his son as his successor, he
could accomplish this by placing his son's name on the
list of candidates and then choosing the proper electors
2for the electoral college.
Willoughby swiftly assessed the significance of this
. F. Willoughby, "Memorandum on the New Presidential 
Election. Law," n.d., Willoughby Papers, Box 5, Folder 42, 
Earl Gregg Swem Library, College of William and Mary.
2 Ibid.
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change in the election procedure. To his brother V/estel, 
he wrote that the law "was as remarkable a state paper 
as you have ever read.” In effect, Yuan claimed the 
presidency through "designation by the late dynasty rather 
than to election by the people." Willoughby was now 
convinced that the new election law was a prelude to 
restoring the monarchy. But because others in Peking saw 
no signs of imminent restoration, he wrote to Westel that 
he might have overestimated the importance of the new 
election procedures. Despite his reservations, Willoughby 
cautiously prepared a memorandum on the new law, fully
aware that Yuan might be using his foreign advisers to
- . 3
give the change legitimacy.
In light of Willoughby's suspicions, his memorandum 
on the presidential election law was remarkably free of 
criticism. He made no suggestions for alteration or repeal 
but stressed that the change might enable China to maintain 
stability and prepare her for popular government. The 
removal of the succession to the presidency from the 
"intrigue" of parties and factions, he thought, might 
well be essential in the transition to a republic. "In 
the first enthusiasm for popular government," he wrote, 
not enough care had been taken to protect China from the 
threat of internal upheaval. A strong executive could
V. F. Willoughby to Westel, Jan. 7, 27, 1915, ibid., 
Box 5, Folder 35.
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organize an administrative system in which "merit and
efficiency" rather than "political considerations,"
might determine appointments and promotions. Summing up
his case for the law, Willoughby noted that stability and
sound administration were "of especial value during a
transition period such as the one through which China is 
„ 4nov; passing. "
At the conclusion of his memorandum, Willoughby turned 
from the advantages to the disadvantages inherent in a 
highly centralized decision-making process. There was 
always a danger, he stressed, that great power could be 
used "for purposes other than the promotion of the public 
welfare," and that the "political aspirations" of the people 
could be crushed. Such dangers could be avoided if the 
government continued to be accountable to the people, 
protected "free discussion of political matters," and 
established "efficiency and honesty in the administration 
of public affairs."^
Reminding Yuan that China's constitution gave 
sovereignty not to the executive but to the people, 
Willoughby called for "complete publicity" of all actions 
and sound fiscal management to insure good government and 
prepare the Chinese for "larger participation" in "public
^Willoughby, "Memorandum on the New Presidential 
Election Law."
5 Ibid.
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affairs." Accountability, Willoughby argued, would even 
be politically expedient, since it would effectively 
disarm government critics. After subtly warning Yuan 
Shih-k'ai that abuse of power would undermine his govern­
ment, Willoughby concluded on a positive note:
Experience furnishes abundance of proof 
that as much depends upon the spirit and 
manner in which a political system is ^
operated as upon its technical provisions.
Willoughby sent a copy of the memorandum to Westel,
who was then at Johns Hopkins and in close communications
with Goodnow. He had emphasized the positive benefits of
a strong executive, he confided, because he did not want
to offend Yuan or place a stamp of approval upon despotism.
However, on the same day, he wrote Goodnow that Yuan would
be dissatisfied with his cautious endorsement of the law:
What the President wanted, of course, was 
a defense of this act which he could publish.
I think it quite doubtful whether he will 
care to publish my paper.?
The conditions under which Willoughby wrote the 
memorandum revealed the difficulties he faced in influencing 
China's development in any meaningful sense. He knew that 
Yuan sought his advice as a justification because the 
memorandum was requested after the new law was promulgated.
6Ibid.
7W. F. Willoughby to Westel, Jan. 27, 1915, ibid.,
Box 5, Folder 35; and to Dr. Frank J. Goodnow, Jan. 27,
1915, Manuscript Collection, Johns Hopkins University Library.
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Nevertheless, Willoughby remained committed to the es­
tablishment of a stable China and the development of 
conditions leading to a republican form of government.
China's constitutional problems, however, faded in 
importance as tensions between China and Japan reached the 
flash point. In January, 1915, Japan presented her Twenty- 
One Demands, which posed a serious threat to China's 
sovereignty. The Demands were presented in five groups, 
all of which gave Japan predominance in determining China's 
economic, political, and military affairs. Of the groups, 
the fifth was the most important, because it would 
virtually have transformed China into a protectorate of 
Japan. The Japanese insisted upon total secrecy of the
true nature of the demands, particularly that of the fifth 
8group.
Had the Chinese not leaked a copy of the actual demands
to diplomats and newsmen, Japan's attempt to conceal their
9contents might have succeeded. As soon as American 
Minister Paul S. Reinsch and Charge E. T. Williams learned 
of the real version, they recognized the threat to the 
Open Door. Reinsch advised Yuan to consider each demand 
separately in negotiations with Japan— in effect, to
^Tien-yi Li, Woodrow Wilson's China Policy, 1913-1917 
(New York: Octagon Books, 1969 ), pp6 105-104-".
^Jerome Ch'en, Yuan Shih-k'ai, 1859-1916 (London: 
George Allen and Unwind Ltd. , I960), p . 191 .
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stall for time.1*"* It was from Reinsch rather than the 
Chinese that Willoughby first learned of the demands, 
and Willoughby, like Reinsch, regarded Japan's actions 
with grave suspicion.
The reasons for this suspicion lay at least in part 
in his concern over the "real motives" behind the Twenty- 
One Demands. Willoughby regarded with skepticism Japan's 
claim that she v/as defending China against rapacious 
western nations. If Japan had China's best interests at 
heart, he wrote, she would not have treated the Chinese 
with "studied arrogance" and threatened her national 
sovereignty. Willoughby was convinced that Japan sought 
to be "not merely the leader of Asia but the master." 
Whatever Japan's motives, the presentation of the Twenty- 
One Demands had given notice to the world that Japan sought 
hegemony in Asia. The "yellow peril" was not yet imminent, 
but Willoughby cautioned that Japan's actions had raised 
the "great question of the East versus the West."11
Not long after presentation of the demands, Yuan 
Shih-k'ai turned to Willoughby for help in the crisis. He 
first requested a memorandum on the "correctness" of the
Paul S. Reinsch, An American Diplomat in China (Garden 
City, New York: Doubleday, Page, and Co. , 1922 ), pp . 129-130, 
132-133. See also Ch'en, Yuan Shih-k'ai, pp. 192-193.
11W. F. Willoughby to Westel, Mar. 15, 1915, Willoughby 
Papers, Box 5, Folder 35.. In this letter, Willoughby 
revealed that his information on the Twenty-One Demands came 
from Reinsch and American journalist Frederick Moore.
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presentation. Although he was puzzled by the purpose of 
Yuan's request, Willoughby turned out a vigorous de­
nunciation of the Japanese minister to China. The
presentation was not only "insulting" and deceiving, but
12violated proper protocol. Of more importance was Yuan's
request in March that Willoughby write an article on the 
Twenty-One Demands which could be published in the United 
States to win American support for China.
Willoughby was quite willing to write the article.
In fact, he had hoped that Yuan would seek his advice and 
in late March had even offered to act as an emissary
1 **between the American Legation and the Chinese government. " 
Will.oughby, like Reinsch and Charge d'Affairs E. T, 
Williams, was very much concerned that the State Depart­
ment had not grasped the seriousness of Japan's demands.
To Goodnow, Willoughby wrote that Secretary of State Bryan 
was too easily deceived by Japanese assurances of safety 
for the Open Door.^ To his brother, he confided, "Bryan 
is looked upon as an innocent child in their [the Japanese]
12W. F. Willoughby, "Memorandum on the Correctness of 
the Procedure of the Japanese Minister in Presenting Certain 
Demands of his Government Directly to the President of 
China," n.d., Willoughby Papers, Box 5, Folder 42.
■^W. F. Willoughby to Westel, Mar. 29, 1915, ibid.,
Box 5, Folder 35.
■^W. F. Willoughby to Frank J. Goodnow, Mar. 18, 1915, 
Goodnow Papers.
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15hands." Consequently, Willoughby urged Goodnow to make 
effective use of the article as a means to influence 
American opinion. He did, however, caution Goodnow not 
to use his name on the article, fearing that the pub­
lication of an adviser’s name would anger the Japanese.'*'^
In the memorandum which might have been used as a 
draft for the article, Willoughby vigorously warned his 
American readers that the Japanese had succeeded in 
concealing the gravity of their demands and argued that 
the demands, if accepted, would lead to a loss of Chinese 
sovereignty. In a series of rhetorical questions, he 
identified Japan as a threat to reform and progress in
China and warned all western nations to consider Japan’s
17motives for the demands.
Events moved faster than the article. Although Goodnow 
received it in April or May, it came too late for any 
significant impact on American opinion. Goodnow informed 
Willoughby that the Chinese minister in Washington had 
shown him a copy of the Japanese demands early in 1915, 
and he had informed Bryan of their significance:
^W. F. Willoughby to Westel, Mar. 15, 1915, Willoughby 
Papers, Box 5, Folder 35.
16W. F. Willoughby to Goodnow, Mar. 18, 1915, Goodnow
Papers.
17W. F. Willoughby, "Memorandum on Japanese Demands 
on China," n.d., Willoughby Papers, Box 5, Folder 42.
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. . . in case China acceded to these demands
its independence would be seriously impaired 
and the commercial interests of Americans in 
the East would be affected.
By March, Bryan began to recognize the need to defend the
Open Door against Japanese pressure. Although he probably
conceded too much to Japan, the United States and Great
Britain did pressure the Japanese into withdrawing the
19fifth group of demands in May.
Despite the success of the United States and Great
Britain in softening some of the demands, it was clear
that Japan had a. fairly free hand in China as long as the
war in Europe lasted. The United States had no intention
of intervening militarily to preserve China's territorial
integrity, and no European power could afford military
intervention. In President Wilson's analysis, China was
too weak internally to protect her sovereignty, and until
China achieved some degree of stability she was fair game
20for any country capable of exploiting her weakness.
As the weeks passed, Willoughby reached the same 
conclusion. Faced with desperate internal weakness,
China had three options: she could give in to Japan, and
1 $
Frank J. Goodnow to W. F. Willoughby, Mar. 23, 1915, 
Goodnow Papers.
■^Arthur Link, Struggle for Neutrality (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press , i960 ), pp. 294-297.
20Tien-yi Li, Woodrow Wilson's China Policy, p. 129.
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become for Japan what India was to England; she could be
cut up into "spheres of influence," each administered by
a foreign country; or she could give foreigners control
of China's government services, as had already been done.
21with the salt gabelle and the Chinese customs service.
The last option seemed most promising to Willoughby. 
Unless Chinese affairs were "administered by outside help" 
as the United States had done in the Philippines and Puerto 
Rico, China could never hope to preserve her integrity and 
independence. Currency, taxation, and banking systems 
had to be reformed for China's government to survive, and 
only foreign administration could accomplish the reforms. 
Falling back on a comparison familiar to American progres­
sives, Willoughby remarked that China was like a bankrupt
firm. To achieve stability, he suggested that she be put
22through "receivership."
When Willoughby communicated these options to his 
brother, he was not merely engaging in rhetorical exercise. 
He was trying to effect the third option. From his arrival, 
the Chinese had pressed him for advice on floating a large 
loan for the reorganization of her financial system. With 
the presentation of the Twenty-One Demands, the Chinese 
had grown increasingly desperate for funds and now pressed
^ W . F. Willoughby to Westel, Feb. 27, 1915, Willoughby 
Papers, Box 5, Folder 35.
22 Ibid.
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the loan once again. At the request of President Yuan
Shih-k'ai, Willoughby wrote a lengthy letter to Goodnow,
asking him to explore the possibility of a loan with
2 3
commercial bankers in the United States.
In Willoughby's decision to seek a loan lay the
convergence of many American interests in China. To be
sure, Willoughby, like his fellow progressives, was
anxious to secure reform in China and eventually to
establish a republic there; but to secure the reforms,
Willoughby turned to American commercial interests.
American investment would provide China with stability and
prosperity, the basis of progressive government. By
granting a loan, the United States would block Japan's
attempts to subvert the Open Door and would encourage.
*
China to adopt measures to strengthen herself internally-- 
and make her a receptive market for both goods and ideas.
In the memorandum to Yuan Shih-k'ai on the loan, 
Willoughby first stressed that the immediate crisis with 
Japan was only the first of a series of confrontations, 
unless China could make meaningful reforms which would 
help her resist Japanese domination. Without reform,
China could not hope to develop a strong navy or "free 
herself" from a "humiliating" and untrustworthy reliance 
on foreign powers. To develop China, Willoughby proposed
^W. F. Willoughby to Goodnow, Feb. 22, 1915, Goodnow
Papers.
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sv/eeping monetary and fiscal reforms. The reforms,
however, would be expensive. A loan of at least $100
million in gold was absolutely necessary. As he
realistically pointed out, China's tax system could not
support even the immediate needs of the government; it
2 /
could hardly support major reform.
To obtain a loan of that size, China had to turn
abroad. Willoughby advised Yuan that only the United
States could offer such a loan, and indeed was the only
country to which China could safely go. Only the United
States would refrain from placing China under burdensome
"political obligations." He wrote:
The only political interest that the 
United States had in China is that she 
should succeed in her present efforts 
to achieve a strong and stable government.^
Once he had made his best case for an American loan, 
Willoughby then outlined the conditions of the proposed 
loan for Yuan. In the first place, he warned, the loan 
would have to go towards a sincere reform of banking and 
currency. Since any loan would have to be secured, the 
Chinese tax system needed a complete overhaul to provide 
adequate security. Moreover, Willoughby, convinced that
24W. F. Willoughby, "Memorandum on the Desirability 
of China Securing a Loan in the United States for the 
Purpose of Accomplishing the Reform of her Currency, Banking, 
and Taxation Systems," n.d., Willoughby Papers, Box 5,
Folder 42.
Ibid.
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only foreign administration could provide stability in
China, warned Yuan Shih-k’ai that American bankers might
well insist that "Americans or at least persons in whom
they have confidence" would be employed by the Chinese "to
superintend or direct the execution of the reforms."'
Willoughby, of course, was aware that the Chinese
would be less than receptive to this last condition but,
as he wrote to his brother, China needed the loan so
desperately that she would "pay the price in order to get 
27it." Willoughby stressed to Yuan that American 
administrators were no threat to China’s sovereignty.
Turning to the American administration of Puerto Rico 
and the Philippines as examples, he carefully pointed out 
that Americans had worked very hard to turn over adminis­
tration to trained "native inhabitants." In light of 
China’s insolvency, Willoughby vigorously asserted that 
"this temporary alienation of control may be wholly good," 
and offered China a chance for progress and stability. 
Warning that bankers considering the loan would be 
skeptical of China's ability to repay, Willoughby repeatedly
urged Yuan's emissaries to be "frank.and fair" in dealing 
28with them. Willoughby's insistence on pledges of reform
Ibid.
27W. F. Willoughby to Westel, Feb. 27, 1915, ibid., 
Box 5, Folder 35.
2 8Willoughby, "Memorandum on Securing a Loan," ibid., 
Box 5, Folder 42.
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or American control indicated that his faith in the Chinese 
ability to achieve stability on their own had been sorely 
tried.
Although Willoughby wanted very much for the loan to
be made, he was very skeptical about China's ability to
secure such a large loan from American bankers. Consequently,
for either help or reassurance, he floated a trial balloon
to Reinsch. In March, he wrote to Goodnow that Reinsch
29
had responded quite favorably to the loan proposal.
From- Goodnow came still more encouragement. Both B. Howell
Griswold of Alexander Brown and Sons and President Wilson
30had promised strong support. The exact conditions of the
loan, however, were a considerable problem, and Goodnow
urged Willoughby to begin work on plans satisfactory to
31both the Chinese and the American bankers.
The loan proposal, coming as Japan threatened the 
Open Door, provided Wilson and Reinsch with one method of 
curbing Japanese ambition and extending American influence 
in Asia. Both Wilson and Reinsch were very much in favor 
of American loans and investments in China, for they believed
29 *W. F. Willoughby to Goodnow, Mar. 18, 1915, Goodnow
Papers .
30Roy Curry, Woodrow Wilson and Far Eastern Policy, 1913- 
1921 (New York: Bookman Associates, 1957 ), pp. 149-151.
31Goodnow to W. F. Willoughby, May 14, 1915, Goodnow 
Papers. Both Tien-yi Li and Roy Curry wrote that W. W. 
Willoughby suggested the loan to Yuan Shih-k'ai. Apparently 
they have confused William F. Willoughby with his twin, 
because Westel was at Johns Hopkins at this time.
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very strongly that financial, commercial, and industrial
development not only aided China's transformation to a
modern, progressive nation but contributed to the United
32States' prosperity as well. But the high hopes for the
loan faded quickly. Although Wilson endorsed the loan
proposal, he refused to guarantee that the United States
government would enforce collection of the loan. Faced
with Wilson's refusal, worried by China's weakness, and
preoccupied with the credit demands of the European war,
American bankers refused to accept the risks associated
with a $100 million loan. Negotiations for the loan
collapsed while still, in preliminary stages, and with them
collapsed Willoughby's plans for direct American adminis-
3 3tration of the reforms.
The failure to secure the loan dimmed hope for major 
reform in China. From his arrival, Willoughby had been 
anxious to reorganize China’s administrative, monetary, 
and fiscal systems. The first major reform was the over­
haul of the land tax, and he had intricately bound the tax 
to the loan negotiations. Willoughby suggested that the 
reorganized land tax be used as security for the loan.
The loan, then, not only would have strengthened China 
in the face of the Twenty-One Demands but would have acted
165 .
151.
32
Tien-yi Li, Woodrow Wilson's China Policy, pp. 164-
^^Ibid., p. 194; Curry, Woodrow Wilson, pp. 14&, 150-
as a lever on Yuan Shih-k’ai to guarantee change.
The proposal on reform of the land tax submitted to
Yuan Shih-k'ai early in 1915 was one of Willoughby's most
lengthy and methodical memoranda, running some eighty
typewritten pages. Willoughby drew heavily upon his
experience with Puerto Rico's tax system, and he incorporate
proposals progressives had favored for the United States.
The * land tax was essentially to be a tax on land value;
such a tax would be best, Willoughby argued, because land
values remained "comparatively stable" and accrued a
34predictable revenue.
Once the type of taxation had been recommended,
Willoughby put forth a very detailed analysis of how such
a system should be organized. Deftly tying a well-
administered taxation system to China's progress--and
Yuan's survival--Willoughby frequently stressed that
inefficient, unfair assessments and collections encouraged
opposition and even resistance to the central government.
An honest, efficient tax system, he reminded Yuan, educated
35the citizenry politically and also secured their loyalty.
To secure a proper administration, Willoughby fell back 
upon his experience as Puerto Rico: in essence, he
proposed a model civil service system for China.
34W. F. Willoughby, "Memorandum on the Reform of the 
Land Tax System in China," n.d., Willoughby Papers, Box 5, 
Folder 42.
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As he. outlined the duties of each tax official,
Will oughby insisted that only independent, permanent 
specialists--the efficient, apolitical experts so admired 
by progressives--assess and collect the land tax. Willoughby 
here was adamant. The tax collectors would have to be 
vastly different from the provincial rogues previously 
employed, unless China wanted to risk popular unrest. 
Naturally, the tax service would be organized by grades, 
with promotions based strictly on merit. Such honest, 
efficient, and fair administration of taxation would 
surely win support for the government, and still more 
support would accrue if the taxation plan were effected by 
a vote of the provisional national assembly instead of 
presidential order. Hoping to steer Yuan Shih-k'ai towards 
the adoption of republicanism, Willoughby stressed that 
the endorsement of this body would mean that "the people 
themselves, acting through their legal representatives, 
had reached a determination to put their financial system
*5 /v .
upon a sounder basis." This approval would not only 
curb opposition but would surely enhance the legitimacy of 
Yuan's government.
It is difficult to determine how much Willoughby knew 
of China's traditions and history when he made his suggestions 
for reform of her land tax and administrative system.
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Admittedly he too often made faulty comparisons of China
with Puerto Rico, ignoring the very real differences in
population and culture. Too often, the Puerto Rican
"native inhabitants" seemed all too similar to Chinese
natives, perhaps a reflection of racism on Willoughby's
part. But he certainly knew that the Manchu dynasty and
its predecessors had operated an elaborate civil service
system with competitive examinations and graded ranks.
Toe, he probably knew that China had continued the use of
a censorate after the end of the Manchu dynasty to expose
wrongdoing or weakness on the part of government officials.
The provisional constitution of May 1, 1914 had even
established an administrative court to adjudicate disputes
over government rulings. What is clear, however, is that
Willoughby had little faith in the efficacy of Yuan Shih-
k'ai ' s administrative system and was prepared to replace
it with a civil service modelled upon the administrative
37
systems of western nations. He might have used the 
western model because he was so familiar with the operation 
of civil service systems in the United States, Great 
Britain, France, and Germany. On the other hand, his 
willingness to introduce a we stern system into China might 
well have stemmed from a belief that western institutions 
were superior and offered a model for the Chinese to
3 7
Franklin Houn, Central Government of China, 1912-1918 
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 19 57), pp~. 102-103.
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imitate.
Willoughby ’s proposal for land tax reform apparently 
won enough support to be carried beyond the memorandum, 
because Yuan Shih-k’ai wanted him to stay on beyond his 
term as adviser to overhaul the land tax system. Willoughby 
did not particularly want the appointment because he did 
not wish to remain in China beyond the end of his term. 
Moreover, the plan to put the land tax under his adminis­
tration ran into stiff Japanese and Russian opposition, 
probably because they feared increased American influence
O O
in Yuan’s government.
Throughout 1915 and 1916, Willoughby wrote three 
additional memoranda recommending administrative and 
fiscal reforms, and these were largely an extension of 
the principles he had stressed in the longer land tax 
proposal. They were more of a technical nature, concerning 
the establishment of various administrative services, and. 
the appeals to political expediency were not so prominent. 
The memoranda did, however, stress the progressive principles 
Willoughby had tried to effect in Puerto Rico and in the 
United States.
The document on the organization of a civil service 
system concentrated primarily on procedure, not philosophy, 
and repeated many of the recommendations presented in the
38W. F. Willoughby to Simon N. D. North, May, 1915, 
Willoughby Papers, Box 5, Folder 36.
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land tax proposal. As in previous memoranda, Willoughby 
argued that reform was worthless unless China created an 
efficient administration to staff her government depart­
ments. He followed with remarkably detailed advice on 
promotions, compensation, and tenure within the service. 
Throughout, Willoughby v/arned the Chinese not to repeat 
American mistakes: partisanship or favoritism must not
impede the operations of an independent, professional 
39servic e .
The structure of Willoughby's civil service would 
have seemed familiar to an imperial statesman. The imperial 
bureaucracy had provided safeguards against corruption, 
promotions based on merit and seniority, competitive 
examinations, and ratings and grades. Also, both systems 
were designed to promote harmony among different elements 
of society. However, the nature of the harmony and the 
means by which men would achieve it differed greatly.
In China harmony was not achieved through a balance of the 
interests of entrepreneurs, citizens, and labor, but through 
obedience to the social prescriptions set down in Confucian 
classics and histories. The scholar official of Confucian 
tradition had only one essential administrative goal: to
19W. F. Willoughby, "Memorandum on Some Factors 
Involved in Securing Efficiency in the Organization of 
the Personnel in Government Service," n.d., ibid., Box 3, 
Folder 42.
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restore a tranquil, harmonious society.^ To govern 
effectively, the scholar-official had to study the classics 
and inculcate in the people the rules of propriety which 
governed the relationships of men.^
In practice, a number of realities scarred this ideal 
administrative system. For example, society was supposedly 
characterized by close interpersonal relationships, but 
the tasks of government--that is, tax collection or law 
enforcement— forced the scholar away from a humanistic 
relationship with the people. Too, in spite of all their 
study and effort on examinations the officials frequently 
proved to be corrupt and a r r o g a n t P e r h a p s  a more 
serious problem for the Confucian scholars was inherent in 
their utopian vision of society, because it forced th.e 
scholar officials to look back to an ancient order.' The 
vision not only made them blind to changes in society 
wrought by western technology and ideas but led the scholars 
to become entrenched defenders of despotic autocracy.
The concern over maintenance of a stable social order lent 
itself to the acceptance of autocracy as natural and elevated
C. K. Yang, "Some Characteristics of Chinese Bureau­
cratic Behavior," in Confucianism in Action, eds. David S. 
Nivison and Arthur F. Wright (Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 1959); p. 13S.
^Arthur F. Wright, ed., Confucianism and Chinese 
Civi li za ti on (Stanford: Stanford University Pres s, 19*75),
p . x i .
/ 2+ C. K. Yang, "Some Characteristics of Chinese Bureau­
cratic Behavior," pp. 14-6, 14&.
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every emperor to the status of a sage.
By the "beginning of the twentieth century, the Confucian 
scholar-bureaucrat tradition was under serious attack. The 
scholars had failed to maintain the old order with "self- 
strengthening.” The respect for the authority of both 
father and emperor seemed inconsistent with self-government, 
the emancipation of women, and recognition of individual 
dignity. Indeed, it seemed doubtful that the generalist of 
the Confucian tradition could cope with the demands of a 
technologically advanced, urban, industrial nation.^
After Japan defeated China in 1895, steamships, steel, 
and armaments seemed more appropriate topics for study 
than Confucian classics. The scholar K 1ang Yu-wei wanted 
to abolish the "eight-legged essay" during the Hundred 
Days;reforms, but conservatives permitted no change in 
the scholar tradition. In the aftermath of the Boxer 
■Rebellion, however, the Manchus abolished the old exami­
nation system and ordered the inclusion of modern topics
/ 5
in all future examinations.
/ o
William T. DeBary, "Some Common Tendencies in Neo- 
Confucianism," Nivison and Wright, eds., Confucianism in 
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Under the provisions of the constitution of 1914.,
Yuan Shih-k’ai altered the organization of the old censo'rate
and added an administrative court. But Yuan personally-
controlled both the personnel and organization of all
government agencies, and under his direction the adminis-
46trative system functioned erratically. For example, the
constitution provided for a board of audit, but the board
accomplished nothing. In theory, Yuan Shih-k’ai prepared
4 7a budget, but in practice, he spent funds as he saw fit.
\
When Willoughby proposed reorganization of the land 
tax, the civil service, and later, the financial system, 
he was in effect, attempting to fill an institutional vacuum. 
He was not, however, free of remnants of China’s traditional 
bureaucratic system. The Confucian order was under attack, 
to be sure; but many Chinese still adhered to Confucian 
principles, and some wanted Confucianism established as a 
national religion. Yuan Shih-k'ai used Confucian rites to 
strengthen his claim on China’s throne, and bureaucrats
of Confucian persuasion still retained posts in his
, 48 government.
The bureaucracy that Willoughby proposed would have
^Houn, Central Government, p. 89.
<47Ibld. , p. 99.
4 8Tse-tsung ChowT, "The Anti-Conf i cian Movement in 
Early Republican China," in Wright, ed., The Confucian 
Persuasion, pp. 290-291; Jerome Ch’en, Yuan Shih-k’ai,
ITnd ed. CStanford: Stanford Universit y P re ss, 1972 ), p. 208
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been vastly different from that of traditional China. The 
impartial expert, a specialist, would have had little in 
common with the generalist of imperial days. Instead of 
working for the restoration of a society characterized by 
hierarchy and stability, Willoughby's bureaucrat used his 
specialized knowledge to promote political democracy.
The primary function of his bureaucrat was harmonization 
of the interests of citizens, labor, and business, not the 
restoration of an ancient utopia. As in the Confucian 
tradition, the bureaucrat acted in the people's best 
interests, but under Willoughby's plan, the government-- 
and ultimately the bureaucrat--were accountable to the 
citizens.
Willoughby did not believe that the citizens of China 
were prepared to define their own interests through, self- 
government. Previously he had written that conditions in 
China were not yet suitable for the establishment of 
political parties or legislative bodies. Instead, he 
urged China's leadership to develop conditions under which 
self-government could exist, and the bureaucracy was a key 
element in developing these conditions. The bureaucrat, 
like his Confucian counterpart, would teach the people by 
the efficient completion of his tasks that their government 
was legitimate, stable, and capable of protecting their 
interests. When the people recognized the authority of 
their government, national leaders could then encourage 
the establishment of local, provincial, and national
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4-9assemblies. Instead of protecting the old order,
Willoughby’s bureaucrat prepared China for massive social
and political change.
In short, then, Willoughby’s plan for a civil service
was not so revolutionary in its structure as in its
implications. If his plan was put into effect, China
would have to adopt republican principles--principles very
much inconsistent with a hierarchical social structure.
In truth, it is doubtful that the Chinese could have
adopted his proposals. As Willoughby realized, the Chinese
had not yet reached a consensus on the type of government
they wished to have., and the "common man" had not yet
developed either the capability or the desire to exercise
50his political rights. A tradition of authoritarian rule
and a recent history of internal disorder proved to be 
rocky ground for the growth of republican ideas.
As part of his plan to reorganize China's fiscal 
affairs, Willoughby also recommended the establishment of 
a central board of financial control to administer China's 
budget. This recommendation was not entirely new to 
China. During the Hundred Days reforms of 1898', reformers 
had recommended the publication of a budget, and a decade
/ 9
W. F. Willoughby, "Memorandum on the Adjustment of 
the Financial Relations Between the Central Government, 
the Provinces, and the Local Governing Bodies," n.d., 
Willoughby Papers, Box 5, Folder 4-2.
50 Ch'en, Yuan Shih-k'ai, 2nd ed., p. 211.
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later, the Manchus promised to implement a budget system.
The constitution of the republic also established a budget,
51but Yuan Shih-k’ai had never prepared an effective one.
In his memorandum, Willoughby urged the Chinese to prepare
budgets, audit accounts, and publish proper reports.
When properly administered, he argued, budget and audit
systems enabled the president to exercise close supervision
over his executive departments. Furthermore, if the central
board drafted and enforced regulations for the financial
administration of the provinces and localities, Yuan Shih-
5 2k'ai could strengthen his control of the hinterland.
In his last memorandum on administrative reform, 
Willoughby explained in more detail his plans to extend 
the budget and audit systems to the provincial and local 
governments. His plans focused on a significant problem 
in China, because the provincial governments were tied 
only tenuously to Peking. Yuan Shih-k’ai held the provinces 
in check more by his decision to appoint loyal military 
governors than by claims to the loyalty of the people. 
Certainly the people of far-removed provinces had few 
government services to bind them daily to Peking. The ex­
tension of the financial system, Willoughby reasoned, would 
provide a method of placing China under the direction of a
51Hsu, Rise of Modern China, p. 446; Houn, Central 
Government, p. 99.
52Willoughby, ’’Memorandum on Adjustment of Financial 
Relations-. ,f
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5 3
central administrative system.
Willoughby first recommended that the central govern­
ment appoint administrators to supervise local and 
provincial finances. The central board should then grant 
each locality and province a share of general tax revenue 
for local use. Efficient, responsible administration of 
local and provincial finances would reinforce the legiti­
macy and authority of all levels of government. Then, when 
the people recognized the legitimacy of their government 
and respected its authority, officials could allow popular 
participation in political organizations and eventually 
in assemblies. Willoughby wrote:
If China is to bring into existence a form 
of government under which larger and larger 
participation in the conduct of government 
affairs is to be conferred on the people, 
or they acquire the capacity for the proper 
exercise of political power, a beginning 
must be made in the field of local and pro­
vincial government.^
Because Willoughby did not define precisely either 
the powers of the local and provincial authorities or the 
exact share of revenue they would receive, it is difficult 
to evaluate the effect of this proposal. Certainly too 
great a degree of financial autonomy risked further 
disintegration of relations between Peking and the provinces. 
Willoughby asserted that under his plan the central government
53Ibid.
54Ibid.
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retained enough control over the localities to prevent 
such disintegration. No taxes could be levied or money 
borrowed without permission of the central government; the 
"chief executive" of each province had to submit a budget 
for Peking's review; and finally, travelling examiners
5 5and auditors could inspect provincial and local records.
Despite his realistic assessment of the need for
central control of China’s finances, Willoughby's plans
for the implementation of a budget system were probably
too optimistic. The specialist’s traditionally low status
in the imperial Chinese bureaucracy, the widespread
corruption in. Yuan's regime, and the existence of nearly
autonomous dictatorships in many of China's provinces
presented virtually insurmountable obstacles to the estab-
56lishment of a properly administered budget. Willoughby
knew that the recruitment and training of an efficient
staff of specialists would be very difficult, but he
remained hopeful. If China's leadership seriously tackled
reform, he wrote Westel, progress could be made towards an
57efficient administration of her affairs.
56Ch'en, Yuan Shih-k'ai, 2nd ed., p. 211; C. K. Yang, 
"Some Chara c teris ti c s o f 'C h i n e s e Bureaucratic Behavior,"
p. 138.
57W. F. Willoughby to Westel, Mar. 26, 1916, Willoughby
Papers, Box 5, Folder 35.
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Willoughby was anxious to achieve in China a reform
that he and other advocates of scientific management had
net yet been able to accomplish In the United States.
While he served on the Taft Commission, he recommended
that the nation adopt a budget system, but Congress did
not act on his recommendation until 1921. In later years,
he regarded his role In the establishment of the Bureau
of the Budget as the most significant achievement of his 
5 Slife. His plan to implement a similar budget system in 
China Is significant to the evaluation of his work there, 
for it reveals why Willoughby, from his arrival in Peking, 
stressed administrative reform over constitutional reform.
In Willoughby's mind, China faced several inter­
related problems, and he took very seriously his responsi­
bility as an adviser to help China overcome them. One 
problem for both China and the United States was the 
maintenance of China's integrity. To resist pressure from 
Japan or Russia, which wished to make substantial 
encroachments on her territory, China needed a strong 
government and financial solvency. To achieve a strong 
government capable of resisting both external pressure 
and internal disintegration, Yuan Shih-k'ai had to develop 
some link between the people and the central government 
in Peking. In short, both the maintenance of the Open
5 SInterview with William W. Willoughby, Bohun Farm, 
Mathews, Virginia, July 31, 1974.
Door and the development of self-government in China 
depended upon the maintenance of a stable government.
To achieve stability, Willoughby turned not to 
constitutional models but to American progressive ideas.
For Willoughby, the administrator, the impartial expert in 
an efficient administrative system, was to provide the 
stability China needed. The administrative systems-- 
particularly taxation, which touched every citizen--would 
provide the essential link between the people and the 
government, an avenue of communication and service. The 
stability provided by the civil service, working within 
well-organized government agencies, would provide an 
atmosphere suitable for the growth of republicanism and 
incidentally for American political, social, and economic 
influence. The administrator, armed with the techniques 
of scientific management, became the means of establishing 
a modern, efficient China.
By the spring of 1915, however, Willoughby had grown 
discouraged by China's inability to reorganize her govern­
ment. He then had concluded that either China had to 
provide the experts to aid her transition to a modernized, 
western, republican nation or had to submit to "receivership 
Yuan Shih-k'ai's acceptance of almost all of the Twenty-One 
Demands brought a break in the tension between Japan and 
China, and in June, Goodnow and Westel Willoughby were due 
to arrive in Peking. Although they were not always 
consistent with China's traditions, Willoughby's suggestions
had
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59W. F. Willoughby to Westel, May 13, 1915, Willoughby 
Papers, Box 5, Folder 35.
CHAPTER IV 
THE MAN WHO WOULD BE KING
In May, 1915, the Chinese government accepted most 
of the demands Japan had made, and for the moment the 
crisis “between the two nations passed. Willoughby was 
convinced that little had been resolved between China and 
Japan that spring. To his sister Alice he wrote that Japan 
would continue "to push her claims further as the oppor­
tunity presents itself.Nevertheless, tension had 
lessened as summer approached, and Willoughby was now
preoccupied with the impending visit from Dr. Goodnow
2and his brother and close confidant, Westel.
According to Goodnow's contract, he was to return to
3
Peking at Yuan Shih-k'ai's request in the summer of 1915. 
When President Yuan had extended an invitation to return, 
Goodnow had accepted and arrived in Peking in July. Westel 
apparently had no specific duties but had come with Goodnow
William F. Willoughby to Alice, May 20, 1915>
Willoughby Papers, Box 5, Folder 35, Earl Gregg Swem Library,
College of William and Mary.
^W. F. Willoughby to Westel, May 27, 1915, ibid.
3
See copy of W. F. Willoughby's contract with China's 
government, ibid . , Box 1, Folder 2.
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to visit his brother and see first-hand conditions in China. 
The situation could hardly be described as placid. Since 
the promulgation of the new presidential election law in 
January, signs had appeared in Peking that an attempt to 
restore the monarchy was imminent.^ Although Yuan pro­
claimed loyalty to the republic, and American Minister 
Paul Reinsch discounted the rumors, many foreigners in the 
Legation Quarter believed that the days of the republic
c.
were numbered.^
Soon after entering the rumor-filled capital, Goodnow 
turned his attention to the problems of China's constitutional 
development. Like Reinsch, Wilson, and the Willoughbys, 
Goodnow hoped that China would follow the American example, 
but he also recognized that she was not ready for either 
sweeping reform or republican government. Goodnow in 
particular contended that a nation could not simply adopt 
whatever form of government its leaders desired. The
7
government had to reflect that nation’s history and culture.
^Jerome Ch'en, Yuan Shih-k'ai, 1859-1916 (London: George 
Allen and Unwin, Ltd~ 1960 ), pp. 213-215.
5Ibid., p. 215. See also Paul S. Reinsch, An American 
Diplomat in China (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, Page,
and Company, 1922"), pp. 171-172.
Jerry Israel, Progressivism and the Open Door 
(Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1971), p. 123.
7
Noel Pugach, "Embarrassed Monarchist: Frank J. Goodnow 
and Constitutional Development in China, 1913-1916," Pacific 
Historical Review, 4-2 (Nov. 1973 )* 505-506. See also 
Re’iri s"c h, An" A merican Diplomat, p. 46.
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China, with its tradition of authoritarian rule, could 
not develop into a model republic without a transition 
period.
Because he believed that China was not ready to 
transform western political' theory into a workable, stable 
government, Goodnow had not condemned Yuan's harsh treatment 
of the Kuomintang or his dissolution of the Chinese
g
national assembly. Like Reinsch, W. W. Rockhill, and
later Willoughby, Goodnow was convinced that China's
greatest need was stability, and Yuan, even with tendencies
towards absolutism, provided a mea sure of stability for 
9China.
However, Goodnow still kept sight of an eventual 
republican government for China. Far from extending Yuan's 
absolutism, Goodnow had tried in 1913-1914 to steer Yuan 
towards recognition of basic personal freedom, respect for 
his opposition and restoration of a legislature with 
limited p o w e r T h e  legislature was included in the May, 
1914 provisional constitution, but Goodnow knew its 
inclusion was little more than window-dressing to achieve 
support from foreign nations
^Pugach, "Embarrassed Monarchist," 507
9Ibid . , 510.
1 0 — -i • ,Ibid., 507.
1 1 ., Ibid., 504, 509.
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When Goodnow arrived in Peking, Yuan Shih-k'ai
requested a memorandum discussing the relative merits of
various types of governments for China. Although Goodnow
had been pessimistic in 1914- about his chances for affecting
12meaningful change, he submitted the memorandum in August. 
Normally such a memorandum would have caused little or no 
notice in the press, but this document gave Yuan Shih-k'ai 
and the supporters of the monarchy the legitimacy the
13movement needed to gain public attention and support.
Goodnow began the memorandum with descriptions of the
republican governments in the American and European states.
The experiences of these nations, he wrote, proved that
the most important condition for maintaining republican
government— the stable succession to executive power —
was best solved by a nation with a f,high degree of
intelligence,” and a tradition of participatory government.
In nations without such a tradition, failure to solve the
problem of providing an'orderly succession led frequently to
anarchy, disorder, and dictatorship. Such disorder in
China would surely lead to intervention by foreign powers,
he warned, for disorder threatened the "economic interests 
of the European world.
1 2Ibid., 510.
1 3Reinsch, An American Diplomat, p. 47.
14Goodnow memorandum, m  United States Department of 
State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1915 
( Washingtoffj D . C . : Government Pr inting Office, 1924),
pp. 57-58.
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China then faced great danger to her internal stabili­
ty and national sovereignty if this "great problem of 
presidential succession" remained "unsolved." In light 
of the agitation for the reestablishment of the monarchy, 
Goodnow then drew a dangerous and puzzling conclusion to 
his discussion of republicanism:
It is of course not susceptible of doubt that 
a monarchy is better suited than a republic for 
China. China’s history and traditions, her 
social and economic conditions, her relations 
with foreign powers all make probable that the 
country would develop that constitutional 
government which it must develop if it is to 
preserve its independence as a state more 
easily as a monarchy than as a republic.1^
This conclusion was qualified by the assertion that the
monarchy could be established if no opposition to it
appeared and that change was unlikely to bring "any lasting
benefit to China" unless it was clearly a constitutional
16monarchy with popular participation. These qualifications,
however, vvere ignored by the Peace Planning Society, which 
Yuan’s supporters formed to win support for the monarchy.
It freely exploited both the memorandum and Goodnow's 
position as an adviser to prove that a monarchy was best
17
for China. Goodnow's later protests than his memorandum 
had been misunderstood had little effect.
1 ^Ibid., pp. 57-58.
^^Ibid . , p . 58.
^Ch'en, Yuan Shih-k ’ ai , pp. 20-4-205.
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Goodnow's purpose in writing this memorandum has never 
been made clear. Jerome Ch'en, ’in his biography of Yuan 
Shih-k'ai, has remarked that the reason why Goodnow made
18such a "naive" statement remains "a historical mystery."
Paul Reinsch, the American minister, offered this explanation
for the memorandum:
Advisers had been so generally treated as 
academic ornaments that Dr. Goodnow did not 
suspect that in this case the memorandum 
would be made the starting point and basis 
of positive action. -*-9
There is certainly an element of truth in Reinsch's appraisal,
for Goodnow probably did not realize that the Peace Planning
Society was in fact using his genuine concern for China to
2 0win approval for its plans.
However, historian Noel Pugach recently has argued
that Goodnow was not merely writing philosophically about
government alternatives when he drafted the memorandum.
During 1914. Goodnow feared that Yuan Shih-k'ai was moving
towards autocracy, and this unease hastened his departure 
21
from China. ' Despite his fears of Yuan's intentions and 
his sincere desire for a Chinese republic, Goodnow also
19Reinsch, An American Diplomat, p. 173.
2 0Ibid., p. 47.
21'Pugach, "Embarrassed Monarchist," 313.
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genuinely feared that Yuan's death would leave China in 
chaos. Consequently, he wrote the memorandum not blindly 
but in hope that a constitutional monarchy would give
22China the stability it needed for progress and reform.
Willoughby's correspondence gives support to Pugach's
analysis. Willoughby had written his brother in January
about the implications of the presidential election law
and asked that this information be passed along to Goodnow.
He also sent Westel both news clippings and his memorandum
23about the law. When Goodnow arrived, Willoughby was 
ill with a respiratory ailment and had been out of contact 
with developments in Peking. Nevertheless, Goodnow knew 
of the monarchial sentiment. To Simon N. D. North of,the 
Carnegie Endowment Willoughby wrote that Goodnow "hear-d 
the matter discussed as soon as he reached Peking." He 
had not consulted about the memorandum, Willoughby reported, 
and added that "it came as quite a surprise to me." He 
was convinced that Goodnow had not volunteered the statement 
but that Yuan Shih-k'ai had requested it. Like Reinsch, 
and Pugach, Willoughby believed that Goodnow's good 
intentions had been used by the monarchists. Goodnow did 
not instigate the monarchial movement, as it appeared, 
but the memorandum was "seized upon as an excuse for
22Ibid., 312, 513-516.
2 *^ W. F. Willoughby to Westel, Jtan. 7, 27, 1915, 
Willoughby Papers, Box 5, Folder 35.
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2 Llaunching the movement publicly.”
When Willoughby returned to Peking from a September
vacation, the plans for the establishment of the monarchy
v/ere well under way. While his supporters feverishly
made plans for his enthronement, Yuan Shih-k’ai modestly
declared that he would not accept the throne, perhaps as
2 5a ploy to sound out possible opposition to the move.
By October, plans had been made to call a "citizen’s
2 6convention” to vote upon the change. Even Chinese who
wanted progress and reform under a constitutional government
supported the monarchy, possibly out of fear or perhaps
out of hope that the establishment of the monarchy would
satisfy Yuan’s ambitions and permit concentration on 
27reform.
Not all Chinese welcomed the proposed change. As 
various pro-monarchy and republican factions in Peking 
competed for his support, Willoughby found himself in an 
uncomfortable position. Some Chinese officials, including 
the secretary of state, asked him to use his influence as 
an adviser to persuade Yuan to give up plans for the
W. F. Willoughby to Simon N. D. North, Jan. 4, 1916, 
ibid., Box 5, Folder 36. See also W. F. Willoughby to 
Westel, Sept. 8 , 1915, ibid.
^;New York Times, Aug. 25, 1915.
^^New York Times, Oct. 9, 1915.
2 7Reinsch, An American Diplomat, pp. 176-177.
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monarchy. At the same time, the minister of agriculture
reported to Yuan that Willoughby favored the change.
Willoughby cared little about palace intrigue, but he
feared the reestablishment of the empire. To his brother
he confided, "absolutism . . .  is likely to be a feature
2 8of a monarchy if it is restored." If the president asked
for advice, Willoughby wrote, he did not intend to be used
as Goodnow had been. He would try to persuade Yuan to
move to the "right form" of government rather than "approve
29the change itself."
The memorandum Yuan soon requested on the change to 
monarchy was one of the shortest of Willoughby's papers.
He deftly avoided placing his approval on the establishment 
of a monarchy and avoided altogether the vital question of 
whether monarchy was best for China. At this point, 
Willoughby argued, the form of government was not nearly 
as important as the need to establish a constitutional 
government. The commitment in 1912 to a republican form 
was not as significant as the decision to construct a 
government of law. This decision "constituted the really 
revolutionary feature of the change then effected." Law,
o 0
W. F. Willoughby to Westel., Sept. 18, 1915, Willoughby 
Papers, Box 5, Folder 35.
29W. F. Willoughby to Westel, Oct. 4, 1915, ibid. In 
this letter Willoughby wrote that Roy Anderson, an American 
close to ma-ny Chinese officials, favored the monarchy and 
might have induced Goodnow to write the memorandum.
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not the "arbitrary will of the sovereign," gave legitimacy
to China's government, and no discussion of the form of
30government should "obscure this fundamental fact."
Identifying constitutional government with progress, 
Willoughby warned against any appearance of absolutism. 
Because China was now committed to constitutional government, 
"great care should be taken that no backward step is made 
in this respect." To be sure, a monarchy could be a 
constitutional government, but constitutions were .generally 
associated with republics. This association had occurred 
because monarchies were historically prone to absolutism. 
Consequently, Yuan's reestablishment of the monarchy would 
be understood both domestically and internationally as 
evidence of reaction, not progress, "a setback to 
constitutionalism, unless extreme precautions are taken 
to insure that this is in fact not the case." Yuan’s 
decision to restore the monarchy, Willoughby concluded, 
would be judged by future generations on its ability to
preserve China's commitment to modern constitutional
+ 31 government.
At the same time that Willoughby expressed his 
commitment to a constitutional government, he recommended
30W. F. Willoughby, "Some Observations on the Proposed 
Change of the Government of China from a Republic to that 
of a Monarchy," n.d., ibid., Box 5, Folder 42.
31Ibid.
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that a national assembly be included in the permanent
constitution to serve as a consultative and advisory body
to the "chief executive." Willoughby again emphasized
that the chief executive could not rely on autocratic
power but needed to respond to public opinion and be
held accountable for his actions. The national assembly
was the device by which the chief executive could, be held
accountable. He would present all proposed laws to the
assembly for discussion, and the assembly in turn
represented China's "public opinion." Moreover, the chief
executive had to give to the assembly "a full account of
the manner in which the great powers vested in him" were 
32"exercised." Thus, the national assembly had the power
to assure that the actions of the chief executive conformed
to the "desires of the people." As a further check, the
publication and open discussion of the national budget
required under Willoughby's plan insured that the chief
3 3executive was using his power wisely.
In his discussion of the budget, Willoughby explored 
again the problem of accountability. Government in China 
had to rest upon law, he argued. A chief executive could 
have "almost autocratic powers" as long as he exercised
32 . . . .W. F. Willoughby, "Memorandum on the Advisibility
of Providing in the Permanent Constitution that the National 
Assembly be an Advisory and Consultative Body Only," n.d., 
ibid.
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them "in accordance with the procedures laid down in the 
constitution." If matters of state were left solely to 
China's assembly, the result would be "dissensions and 
disorder," leading to serious internal trouble. However, 
the discussion of a budget by the assembly provided a 
rational check over the chief executive's actions. His 
proposal was not perfect, Willoughby admitted, but it at 
least represented "an enormous step . . . away from a regime
of pure autocracy" and laid a "basis for the progressive 
development of a government of public opinion as the 
political education of the people is achieved." More 
significantly, Willoughby concluded that the adoption of 
his proposal would secure these benefits without jeopard­
izing China's basic need for a strong central government
34to maintain stability.
Since Yuan's plans to increase his personal power 
through the monarchy seemed clear by the fall of 1915, 
Willoughby's proposals to check the actions of the "chief 
executive" through public opinion and the publication of 
a budget seem hopelessly naive. However, Willoughby was 
well aware of Yuan's ambitions and realized as well that 
the chance for constitutional, if not republican government, 
was fading in China. His memoranda represented an attempt 
to turn Yuan Shih-k'ai away from autocracy. If Yuan wanted
90
support for the monarchy, he certainly received little
from Willoughby. The constant reminders that power was
derived from a constitution and that Yuan had to be
accountable to the people’s representatives gave no stamp
of approval to the exercise of imperial prerogatives. In
giving advice on the proposed change, Willoughby walked a
narrow line. On the one hand, he did not want to give
the impression of supporting the monarchy; on the other
hand, outright opposition would have closed his access to
Yuan altogether.
Although there was some opposition to the monarchy in
southern China, and although Japan and the Allies pressured
China to postpone the change to a monarchy, the movement
for its establishment continued through the fall. The
motives for the Allies' opposition were not entirely clear.
In the case of the Europeans, they feared perhaps that the
35change would cause unrest and endanger their concessions. 
Indeed, Japan's opposition to the monarchy might well have 
been designed to incite rebellion within China, thus 
providing an excuse for intervention to "restore order" 
and extend her influence. Willoughby, fearing that the 
Allies had allowed Japan a free hand in Asia while the
^ New York Times, Nov. 2, 1915.
O Y
YIm Kwan-ha, "Yuan Shih-k'ai and the Japanese," 
Journal of Asian Studies, 24- (November, 1964-), 64; Ch'en, 
Yuan Shih-k1ai, pp. 215-217.
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European war raged, wondered in a letter to Westel about
Japan's "real motives" in opposing the reestablishment of 
37the empire. However, Yuan and his supporters, discounting
the advice of Japan and the European powers, planned well.
When the national conference was called to vote on the
proposed change, all 1,993 delegates, using the same forty-
five characters on their ballots, voted unanimously for
the change and designated Yuan Shih-k'ai as the new 
38emperor.
On December 11, 1915, the Council of State asked Yuan
to accept the throne. uYfter an initial modest refusal,
Yuan accepted the offer, stating that he could not refuse
39the people's wishes. Willoughby watched these moves 
with deep regret. Since he had submitted the memorandum 
on the proposed change, Yuan had not sent for him. In 
October he confessed to Westel,. "I do not imagine that I 
will do much of importance for China during the remainder 
of my stay."^^ In December, soon after Yuan accepted 
the throne, he wrote:
F. Willoughby to Westel, Nov. 5, and Dec. 17,
1915, Willoughby Papers, Box 5, Folder 35.
■^Ch'en, Yuan Shih-k'ai, p. 212.
^ New York Times, Dec. 12, 1915, and Dec?. 16, 1915.
4 0 W. F .- Willoughby to Westel, Oct. 20, 1915, Willoughby 
Papers, Box 5, Folder 35.
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I am inclined to think that Yuan will 
make it as absolute a gov't [sic] as he 
dares. I am by no means sanguine in 
respect to the ultimate result of the 
change . ^
Thereafter Willoughby turned his attention to making 
arrangements for his return to the United States.
Official American reaction to the monarchy was muted. 
Although President Wilson, American Minister Reinsch, and 
Secretary of State Robert Lansing were skeptical of the 
change, they still believed that Yuan Shih-k’ai was the 
ruler who could best maintain order in China. Moreover, 
like Willoughby, they perceived Japan's opposition to the 
monarchy as an attempt to weaken China’s internal stability. 
Consequently, when asked b y  other powers to oppose the 
monarchy, the United States refused. Instead, the govern­
ment announced that the establishment of the monarchy was 
purely an internal matter and that China could choose her 
own government without foreign interference. China was 
not Mexico; and stability there was necessary to block 
Japanese encroachments on the Open Door. Since stability 
could possibly be achieved with the monarchy, Reinsch 
and Lansing recommended recognition of the change.
Outside diplomatic circles, American reaction was 
mixed. Willoughby wrote to Westel that the Carnegie
^W. F. Willoughby to Westel, Dec. 17, 1915, ibid.
^^Tien-yi Li, Woodrow Wilson’s China Policy, 1913-1917 
(New York: Octagon Books, 1969), pp. 14-9-153.
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Endowment was displeased "with Goodnow's connection with
the monarchist movement h e r e . F r e d e r i c k  Moore, a
correspondent of the Associated Press and a friend of
Willoughby, assured the readers of World's Work that Yuan
was not "personally ambitious" but had been "persuaded by
the men around him" to take the throne.^  The Outlook
argued that the form of government in China was not as
important as its commitment to "social morality" and noted
philosophically that "a republic in our radical sense of
/ 5
the word is hardly adapted to China’s social system.
An editorial in the Independent, however, called Yuan's 
reestablishment of the monarchy a "gigantic crime," "the 
crowning act of . . .  a long career of intrigue and 
treachery." Urging revolt against the regime, the 
Independent boldly summoned the United States "to the 
rescue of the Chinese people in their hour of distress.
Some Chinese needed little urging from the Independent 
to begin a revolution. In late December, Yunnan province 
declared itself independent of Yuan's rule, and Kweichow
43w. F. Willoughby to Westel, Dec. 17, 1915, Willoughby
Papers, Box 5, Folder 35.
^Frederick Moore, "Yuan Shih-k'ai and the Throne of 
China,.’’ World’s Work, 31 (Feb. 1916), 373.
^^"China: Republic or Monarchy," Outlook, 111 (Sept.
1, 1915), 15.
^ " A  Betrayal of the Republic," Independent 53 (Dec.
20, 1915), 457.
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soon followed. Some provincial leaders were genuinely-
disgusted by the restoration of the monarchy, but others
merely hoped to increase their personal power. Whatever
the reasons for their revolt, Yuan had only limited
success in crushing it, because support for his government
had eroded in many areas of China. Because of the revolts
and the threat of Japanese intervention, Yuan postponed
48his coronation several times. The December revolt had
greatly strengthened the hand of Japanese officials who
wanted to use internal disorder as an excuse for extending
Japan's influence in China. By March, the Japanese were
fully committed to the support of the rebels and the
49destruction of Yuan Shih-k'ai’s regime.
Although Willoughby believed at first that Yuan could 
control the rebellion, he grew more pessimistic as the 
months passed. He wrote to Westel early in March, 1916, 
that there was "a possibility that the government will 
find itself unable to repress the rebellion." The personal 
loyalty of the Chinese officials once given to Yuan had 
weakened to the point that he was received as a "political 
appointment who has thought first of his own aggrandizement." 
Willoughby concluded:
47Immanuel Hsu, The Rise of Modern China (New York: 
Oxford University PressJ 197 0 ), pp. 570-571.
^Ch'en, Yuan Shih-k'ai, pp. 227-228.
49Yim Kwan-ha, "Yuan Shih-k'ai and the Japanese," 69-71.
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. . . my work here is practically finished.
Practically no call has been made for my 
services since I refrained, from coming out 
in favor of a monarchy.^
Soon after Kwangsi province declared itself independent
on March, 15, 1916, Yuan Shih-k'ai's reign as emperor
ended. The revolt’s spread across China was certainly
one cause of the monarchy's failure. Yuan had lost much
of his personal control over the army while he served as
president, and key military leaders had become opportunistic
rather than loyal. As the army's loyalty shifted from
Yuan to provincial military leaders, China's financial
situation grew more unsteady, and Japanese pressure on
China intensified. Yuan was forced to renounce the monarchy
on March 22 and call for the establishment of a cabinet
51system of government.
This action, however, did not end the turmoil in China. 
Convinced that Yuan had to leave office, rebellious elements 
continued the war against him. In April, Willoughby mused 
that Yuan was "so discredited" that he simply could not 
unite China under any system of government. The monarchy 
might have been carried through, he believed, had Yuan not 
shown his weakness in acquiescing to Japan's demands for 
delay.
. F. Willoughby to Westel, Mar. 1, 1915, Willoughby 
Papers, Box 5, Folder 35.
^Ch'en, Yuan Shih-k'ai, pp. 197-199; Yim Kwan-ha,
"Yuan Shih-k'ai and the Japanese," 71-73.
^W. F. Willoughby to Westel, Apr. 2, 1916, Willoughby
Papers, Box 5, Folder 35.
Willoughby continued to worry over Japan’s designs
upon China’s independence, but he greeted the news of the
renunciation of the monarchy with some relief. "A real
effort," he hoped, "will now be made to secure a permanent
constitution and also to effect some administrative change."
Indeed, even as he prepared to leave China, he found hopeful
signs that progress would continue, despite the still-
raging rebellion. He and Reinsch had formed a Chinese
Political Science Association and were pleased with its
initial success. Foreigners and Chinese participated in
discussions and listened to lectures on current affairs
at the association's meetings, and the association planned
to publish a magazine. Both Reinsch and Willoughby hoped
that the organization would provide both leaders and ideas
z /
for a progressive China.
Moreover, even in his last days, Willoughby met with 
a political council, composed of various government 
officials and the advisers from Great Britain and Japan, 
to discuss China's political and administrative problems. 
Although he admitted that the group had been established 
primarily to secure foreign and domestic support for a 
faltering regime, Willoughby believed that the organization
F. Willoughby to Westel, Mar. 26, 1916, ibid .
^William F. Willoughby, "The Chinese Political 
Science Association," Nation, 102 (Feb. 17, 1916), 193; 
Reinsch, An American Diplomat, pp. 153-154.
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"is apparently earnestly seeking to do something." As 
he finished his last letter from China, Willoughby hoped 
that the abandonment of the monarchy meant "a reaffirmation 
of the desire of the people for a republic and a consti­
tution." There was, he believed, real hope that China
5 5could progress if left free of Japanese control.
Willoughby left China on April 19, 1916. His cautious
optimism seemed unfounded. The government was barely
functioning, and unrest in China did not cease for many
years. He was succeeded in Peking, surprisingly, by his
brother Westel, to whom he wrote a lengthy letter after his
return from China. Willoughby predicted Yuan's departure
as leader of China but added that the cabinet system Yuan
had proposed as a sop to the revolutionaries was "all
wrong" and "will lead to years of acute political
disturbances and unrest." Returning to a familiar idea,
he reiterated his firm belief that only a strong executive
with a national assembly could provide China with stable
government. China, he argued, had never settled the
question of how much authority the central government should
have, even though Yuan had in some instances dismantled the
provincial governments through his system of military
56governors.
F. Willoughby to Wrestel, Apr. 2, 1916, Willoughby 
Papers, Box 5, Folder 35.
^W. jr. Willoughby to Simon N. D. North, Apr. 19,
1916, ibid., Box 5, Folder 36.
9B
Like Paul Reinsch, Willoughby believed that key 
reforms could be introduced to China on the provincial 
level. Writing to Westel, he urged that close attention 
be given to reform of provincial and local governments, 
the Chinese tax system, the constabulary, and the adminis­
trative system. Yuan Shih-kTai could no longer hope to 
maintain a stable government for China, nor could the 
proposed cabinet system succeed where Yuan's personal 
government failed. Willoughby concluded, "I see no hope
57for China unless she is prepared to act in a radical way."
To Simon North of the Carnegie Endowment, Willoughby 
wrote again of the threat Japan posed to United States' 
interests in China, and urged that the United States "spare 
no pains" to interpret events there. As for Chinese 
integrity and independence, the future offered little 
promise:
. . . China will in all probabilities have
to confront two alternatives: either she
will enter upon a long period of political 
unrest, or she will have to suffer foreign 
intervention.
On Paul Reinsch's request, Willoughby set forth a 
proposal for direct foreign intervention in China to
5 Q"establish a stable government based on modern principles."^
5?W. F. Willoughby to Westel, Toronto, May 12, 1916, 
Willoughby Papers, Box 5, Folder 35.
^^W. F. Willoughby to Simon N. D. North, Apr. 19, 1916, 
ibid. , Box 5, Folder 36.
59W . F. Willoughby to Paul S. Reinsch, Toronto, May 
12, 1916, ibid., Box 5, Folder 37.
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He proposed the creation of a commission similar to that 
employed by the United States in the Philippines to give 
the Chinese experience and training in government. But 
first, the participating nations would have to agree that 
they would control China only until such time that the 
Chinese could resume self-government. To be sure, the 
commission should set up some "representative" body to 
express Chinese opinion about the manner in which the 
government was run, but major organization would be left 
with foreign governments. Specifically, Willoughby 
recommended the establishment of a civil service system 
to train the Chinese for efficient administration, a code 
commission to revise all law, and a constabulary to enforce 
the law. In addition, foreign powers were to supervise 
reform of the existing revenue and court systems.
The United States had to take care that the major goal
of the intervention was not obscured: the powers were to
work only to educate the Chinese politically and put their
government on a sound basis. The process, Willoughby noted,
was similar to placing China under a "receivership":
. . . As in the case of all receiverships,
it is the duty of the receiver to hasten 
in every way the date on which he can be 
discharged and the enterprise turned over 
to the stockholders . 61
60tv.,I b i d .
61 Ibid .
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That Willoughby would compare China's situation with 
a bankrupt firm was significant, for the comparison 
revealed much about his hopes for China and his conception 
of the role of government in society. The corporation 
was often used by Willoughby and other progressives 
identified with the efficiency and scientific management 
movements as a model for the reorganization of government. 
The corporation used efficient planning and administration 
to handle complex business functions. If well-managed, it 
provided-an excellent example of what professionals and 
experts could accomplish.
The letter to Reinsch marked the end of Willoughby's
term as legal adviser. The time he spent in China was
only eighteen months in a very full life. When he returned
to the United States in the spring of 1916, he worked
actively on preparedness, urging the adoption of efficient,
scientific management techniques to win the war with the
least possible cost in money and manpower. He also accepted
the directorship of the Institute of Governmental Research,
a part of the prestigious Brookings Institute, and worked
with distinction' for many years to promote sound government
administration. While director of the Institute, he
drafted and lobbied for a bill which created the Bureau of 
6 2the Budget. His distinguished public career extended
6 2For an interesting account of Willoughby's work at 
the Institute for Governmental Research, see Will P.
Kennedy, "Silent Partner of Uncle Sam," Washington Star,
Aug. 19, 1928, Willoughby Papers, Box 1, Folder 1.
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two decades beyond his term as adviser to Yuan Shih-k'ai. 
Yuan's term was drawing to a close when Willoughby left 
Asia. Nearly stripped of power, Yuan died in June, 1916. 
At his death he did not leave a strong, stable China, but 
a country dominated by warlords.
EPILOGUE
When William F. Willoughby left Peking in the spring 
of 1916, China was no closer to the establishment of a 
stable government than when he arrived. Yuan Shih-k'ai 
was no longer capable of uniting the country, and the 
emergence of warlords exerted significant centrifugal 
force on Peking. The collapse of Yuan's monarchy left 
China in turmoil. Unfortunately, Willoughby's prediction 
of a long period of'internal unrest was accurate.
The United States had originally supported Yuan Shih- 
k'ai because he seemed capable of establishing a stable 
government in China, and a stable China was essential to 
the maintenance of the Open Door. If China could control 
internal unrest and resist Russian and Japanese encroach­
ments, American entrepreneurs could dispose of surplus 
manufactured goods and dominate the China market. Commercial 
penetration of China would enable the United States to 
preserve its own prosperity and expand its economic 
influence in Asia.
The primary American interest in China, then, was 
commercial, but many citizens wished to expand American 
cultural and political influence as well. In the wake of 
the 1911 Revolution, mi ssi onari e s, educators, journali st s, 
and political scientists went to China to promote the growth
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of republican institutions and encourage her acceptance of 
western ideas. China's internal instability, financial 
weakness, and hesitancy in deciding upon a permanent 
constitution seemed to provide evidence of her need for 
advice from an older republic.
William Willoughby arrived in China with impressive 
experience in public administration. He had reorganized 
Puerto Rico’s tax structure and her municipalities, 
introduced the techniques of scientific management to the 
Census Bureau, and served with distinction on the Taft 
Commission on Economy and Efficiency in Government. Like 
his predecessor Frank Goodnow and most Americans in China, 
he was convinced that China had to establish a stable 
government before she could adopt republican institutions. 
Instead of pressing first for constitutional reform, 
Willoughby proposed a progressive idea--the reorganization 
of China’s administration. An efficient, well-trained 
civil service would curtail corruption and would protect 
the interests of all people. But more importantly, the 
expert— the tax collector, the constable, the accountant-- 
would literally provide the epoxy to hold China together.
The administrator would serve as an efficient channel of 
communication between the people and the leadership. When 
this link was established, truly republican institutions 
could be unveiled, first at the local level, then at the 
provincial level, and then at Peking. In short, Willoughby's 
proposed reforms reflected his identification with American
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progressivism, and his goal--the establishment of a stable 
government--was completely consistent with the policy of 
the Open Door.
Willoughby faced-a number of obstacles to the successful 
implementation of his proposals, and some of them he quickly 
recognized. He knew, for example, that Japan and Russia 
wished to extend their influence in China and that Japan 
would use China’s domestic turmoil as an excuse for direct 
intervention. He also realized that China could not 
successfully control disorder unless she defined precisely 
the power of the central government over her provinces.
Both his proposals for administrative reform and his 
promotion of an American loan were designed to meet these 
critical and interrelated problems. Unless Yuan Shih-k’ai 
could control China's provinces and establish a workable 
and financially solvent government, instability was likely 
to continue. Such instability precluded the establishment 
of republican institutions and offered Japan an opportunity 
to expand her influence in China.
Yuan Shih-k’ai’s ambition and his concept of govern­
ment posed yet another obstacle to reform. When Yuan 
promulgated the new presidential election law in December, 
1914, Willoughby knew that the prospects for successful 
development of republican government were growing dim.
Both the new law and Yuan’s request for information on 
Diaz of Mexico demonstrated that he was moving towards
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Increasingly authoritarian rule, and during the rest of 
his term, Willoughby wrote his memoranda accordingly. In 
each of them, he tried to identify constitutional rule 
and administrative reform with Yuan’s self-interest.
Since Yuan was not predisposed towards republican govern­
ment, Willoughby hoped that appeals to political expediency 
might result in progress for China.
Although Willoughby was aware of Yuan Shih-k'ai's 
ambition and distrust of republican government and recognized 
China’s desperate need for a strong central government, he 
was probably not fully aware of the obstacles to reform 
posed by China's traditions. The Confucian bureaucracy 
respected the generalist, a scholar trained to follow and 
inculcate the teachings of the classics, and it prized 
gentleness, kindness, discretion, and wisdom in its officials. 
The specialist was merely an aide to the generalist, and 
his position possessed little prestige.'*' At the heart of 
a modern bureaucracy, however, was the expert, who was 
able to use his technical training to cope with the problems 
of an urban, industrial, and technologically advanced 
society. He was not supposed to exercise subjective 
judgment but was trained to act impersonally.
Willoughby's bureaucrat was not charged with the
1
C. K. Yang, "Some Characteristics of Chinese Bureau­
cratic Behavior," in Confucianism in Action, eds. David S. 
Nivison and Arthur F . Wright (Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 1959), p. 13&.
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maintenance of a hierarchial social structure but with 
the promotion of "social efficiency," a harmonization of 
the interests of various--and supposedly equal--social, 
political, and economic groups. His expertise and inde­
pendence enabled him to foil special interests in the 
interest of all the people. The Confucian scholar was 
also charged with the preservation of the harmony of society 
and the protection of the people, but in no sense did the 
Chinese peasant determine his best interests. Once the 
transition to republican government was complete, Willoughby's 
bureaucrat ultimately would have been accountable to the
people, making decisions within the framework defined by
2their representatives.
The bureaucrat, then, was not the protector of an 
established social order and authoritarian government but 
the vanguard of participatory democracy. Although he 
admitted that the recruitment and training of his specialists 
would be very difficult and that adoption of his plans 
required "radical" change in China, there is no indication 
in. either his letters or memoranda that Willoughby fully 
appreciated the drastic departure from tradition that 
implementation of his proposals required. In fairness to 
Willoughby, however, it should be noted that many Chinese 
were convinced that the Confucian bureaucracy could not
^Samuel Haber, Efficiency and Uplift (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1964 ), pp. TOl-103, 107.
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cope with the demands of modernization and that China would
have to adopt at least some features of a western civil
3
service system.
Willoughby's comparisons with Puerto Rico also suggest 
that he had only a superficial knowledge of China’s 
traditions and culture. Although his participation in 
the reorganization of that island’s government provided 
valuable experience, he was too quick to draw parallels 
between his successes there and the needs of China.
Obviously, the size of the two countries, their cultures, 
ana their populations differed significantly. The vastness 
of China alone made central control of her hinterland 
difficult. Moreover, Puerto Rico did not initiate reform, 
nor did she develop her own government institutions; the 
United States had imposed a government upon her. The 
.success of that imposition is in question today. Eventually, 
of course, Willoughby despaired of the prospects for 
reform in China and concluded that foreign powers would 
have to reorganize her administration as the United States 
had done in Puerto Rico.
Even if Yuan Shih-k’ai had been receptive to 
Willoughby's proposals, it is doubtful that China’s
William F. Willoughby to Westel, May 12, 1916, 
Willoughby Papers, Box 5, Folder 35, Earl Gregg Swem 
Library, College of William and Mary; William T. DeBary,
’Some Common Tendencies in Neo-Confucianism," in Conf uciani sm 
in Action, eds. Nivison and Wright, p. 48.
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leadership could have put them into effect. The military 
governors in the provinces had no intention of turning 
over their power— and their sources of revenue--to 
Willoughby’s bureaucrats. Moreover, the prospects for 
eventual republican government were not strong. The 
support for a republic in China came from a relatively 
small number of Chinese intellectuals, and the citizenry 
was apathetic, neither willing nor able to participate in 
public affairs. With Yuan’s support, republicanism might 
have won more advocates; but without support of the people, 
a republic could not have been successfully established 
in China.^
When he became frustrated by Yuan Shih-k'ai’s auto­
cratic rule, the incredible scope of China's problems, 
and his own ineffectiveness as an adviser, Willoughby 
turned to consideration of a "receivership." But this 
proposal, too, was unrealistic. Neither the United States 
nor the European powers had enough military power in the 
Far East to occupy and reorganize China. Even if other 
nations had agreed to help, as Willoughby proposed, 
reconciliation of the receivers' interests would have been 
impossible. Japan, for example, simply did not share the 
United States’ desire for a strong, independent China. 
Lastly, nationalism was a potent force in China, and many
^Jerome Ch’en, Yuan Shih-k’ai, 2nd. ed. (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 19V2 ), p. 211.
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Chinese resented European control of her salt and customs 
5
revenue. It is doubtful, then, that the Chinese would 
have peacefully accepted western control of her entire 
administrative system.
In Willoughby's desire for stability and progress 
for China, even at the cost of receivership, lay still 
another inherent problem. Although he thought of himself 
as an impartial expert, he was not. In his mind, the 
interests of China and the United States were identical, 
and he advised the Chinese accordingly. V/hen Willoughby 
perceived that Japan's Twenty-One Demands presented a 
threat to both Chinese and American interests, he urged 
Yuan to establish close diplomatic and financial ties 
with the United States to thwart her ambitions. To be 
sure, Japan's desire to extend commercial and political 
influence in Manchuria, Shantung, and Mongolia were a 
threat to China's sovereignty, but Willoughby's recom­
mendations would have expanded the American presence in 
China. Japan represented the "yellow peril," but American 
expansion promised only a positive influence on China's 
development.
Because Willoughby's goals for China were consistent 
with the goals of American foreign policy, one might reason- 
ablv conclude that Willoughby acted in accordance with
5
John King Fairbank, The United States and China, 3rd. 
ed. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), p~] 190.
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instructions from the United States government. Certainly 
he urged Yuan Shih-k’ai to develop close relationships 
with both the American government and financial community. 
Only the United States, he wrote, had "a keen interest 
and sympathy" towards the establishment of a stable govern­
ment, and he added that the United States was "a great 
political asset to China in the difficulties, Internal 
and external, that confront her." When he explored the 
possibilities of a loan, he fully intended to use it not 
only as incentive for reform but as a means of extending 
American influence in China. Nevertheless, there is no 
evidence that Willoughby acted as an agent of the United 
States in any formal sense. The coincidence of goals 
stemmed from Willoughby's belief that stability and the 
acceptance of American ideas promised progress for China.
The Willoughby Papers and State Department documents 
also give no indication that Willoughby either directly 
or indirectly influenced American policy in China. His 
proposal for a loan perhaps promised an impact on policy, 
but the loan never materialized. The United States never 
intervened either unilaterally or multilaterally to effect 
Willoughby's receivership, and the article on the 'Twenty- 
One Demands came to Goodnow too late to be of use In 
winning American support for China. Since Willoughby and
W. F. Willoughby, "The War, Its Causes, and More 
Important Consequences Likely to Result From It," Nov. 
1914, Willoughby Papers, Box 5, Folder A2.
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Paul Reinsch were close friends, it is possible that he 
might have affected Reinsch's decisions. The two men met 
often for bridge and frequently travelled together. They 
both played a major role in the establishment of the Chinese 
Political Science Association, and both hoped that China 
could eventually adopt a republican government. If 
Willoughby's ideas influenced Reinsch or the American 
State Department, however, their impact remains hidden.
Willoughby's precise relationship with Dr. Frank J. 
Goodnow and the Carnegie Endowment also remains obscure.
The Carnegie Endowment, of course, suggested his appoint­
ment to the Chinese, but the exact circumstances surrounding 
the appointment are still unknown. His relationship with 
Goodnow is even more puzzling. Although he was nominally 
Goodnow’s deputy, Willoughby apparently worked independently 
of him, wrote to him only sporadically, and communicated 
directly with the Carnegie Endowment. The Willoughby 
Papers, however, do provide some new information on the 
mystery surrounding the Goodnow memorandum of August, 1915. 
Unfortunately, Willoughby wrote no letters to his brother 
Westel that summer because his brother was with him in 
China. Consequently, this valuable source on Peking 
affairs is not available. But the letters to Simon North 
and to Westel after his departure from Peking indicate that 
Goodnow was not a naive adviser. Although there is still 
no conclusive evidence of Goodnow's exact intentions,
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one can reasonably agree with historian Noel Pugach that 
Goodnow valued stability in China above the existence of 
a nominal republic.
When Goodnow feared instability in China and faced 
frustration there, he gambled first on a strong presidency 
and then on a monarchy to achieve substantial reform and 
stable government. Willoughby instead chose a solution 
consistent with his background as a public administrator 
and a progressive, the adoption of administrative reform.
In light of the available evidence, however, one can 
conclude that his efforts to influence China failed. He 
could neither persuade Yuan Shih-k'ai to effect major 
reform nor convince him of the value of republican govern­
ment. It is possible that Wrilloughby1 s ideas encouraged 
the Chinese who were already interested in the establish­
ment of a republican government or the application of the 
techniques of scientific management to government adminis­
tration. But there is no evidence that the Chinese ever 
implemented his proposals. The obstacles to the adoption 
of western government and philosophy were too difficult 
to overcome.
What lessons, then, did Americans learn from Willoughby's 
experience? Like many Americans, he was convinced of the 
superiority of western ideas and institutions, and he 
believed China's progress depended upon her adoption of a 
western model for her development. That China would find 
her own solution to her problems probably never occurred
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to him. His own failure to achieve significant reform 
indicated that the power of the United States to influence 
the development of China was limited. Good intentions 
notwithstanding, Americans must respect the right of 
other nations to develop their own institutions in 
accordance with their own history and culture, free from 
any form of ideological imperialism.
American attempts to bring western civilization to 
China continued long after Willoughby's departure, and 
those who followed him met with as little success. Barbara 
Tuchman, in Stilwell and the American Experience in China, 
drew a conclusion about American efforts to influence 
China's development in the 194-0's which was as applicable 
to Willoughby and the Progressives as it was to the Americans 
a generation beyond them: "In the end, China went its own
way as if the Americans had never come."
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